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I. INTRODUCTION
The true story of an illegal conspiracy known today as the "Alliance"
illustrates how sophisticated and destructive fraud can be.' The Alliance
was a network of small California law firms that conspired to defraud
insurers, apparently bilking them out of an estimated $200 million.
2
While many Alliance lawyers eventually landed in jail,3 their clever
schemes left a trail of devastation. In the aftermath, a particularly
troubling and important legal question arose. This Comment searches
for the best answer to that question.
The ultimate issue can be stated as follows: Given that there exists
some evidence of a conspiracy involving the insured to defraud its third-
1. See Don J. DeBenedictis, The Alliance: Did a Network of Small Southern
California Law Finns Conspire to Defraud Insurance Companies to the Tune of $200
Million?, 75 A.B.A. J. 58 (Dec. 1989).
2. See id. at 59.
3. See Myron Levin, 4th Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Complex Insurance Fraud,
L.A. TIEs, Feb. 17, 1990, at B3.
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party insurer,' and that there exists at least one co-insurer of equivalent
status, under what circumstances can one insurer which undertook a
defense of the fraudulent insured (herein called the "payer")
subsequently claim contribution from another insurer (herein called the
"non-payer") for such defense costs under California law?5 This issue
(among others) was recently brought to the California courts, apparently
as an issue of first impression, but was avoided by a statute of
limitations defense.6 The issue encompasses sub-issues and requires a
thoughtful examination of several related areas of insurance law,
including the duty to defend, insurance bad faith, and the law of
contribution. Ultimately, the legal rule adopted will have a significant
effect on the insurer/insured relationship, the frequency and extent of
collusive fraud in our society, the allocation of costs associated with
such collusive fraud, and the availability and affordability of insurance
generally.
In approaching the ultimate issue, this Comment addresses five sub-
issues, as follows:
1. Does or should an insurer have a duty to defend when it "knows"
that the insured is involved in collusive fraud?
2. Assuming there is "substantial" but inconclusive evidence of
collusive fraud, does an insurer who refuses to defend thereby
commit a breach of duty?
3. In connection with a contribution action, are there any
"gatekeeper" duties owed by the payer to the non-payer which
must be satisfied?
4. Given that the non-payer denied coverage on the basis of collusive
fraud, what must be proven in a subsequent contribution action?
5. Assuming that liability must be proven in the contemplated
contribution action, which party should have the burden of proof?
4. I will henceforth refer to such a conspiracy as "collusive fraud." As used
herein, collusive fraud means the knowing involvement of the insured in a conspiracy
involving the attempted perpetration of a fraud on the insurer. Such a conspiracy, in the
context of third-party insurance, involves the collusion of the insured with either or both
of the insured's counsel and the third-party plaintiff.
5. Notice that the issue is confined to defense costs, the significance of which will
become apparent in the discussion of an insurer's duty to defend and its duty to
indemnify.
6. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. National Ben Franklin, No. BC012590 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), aff'd, No. B101206 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1998) (not
published).
This Comment is organized as follows: Part II provides the legal and
factual background necessary to understand these issues. Part Ill
examines these issues and the various arguments that might attend to
each. Part IV offers a proposed resolution of all of these issues. Part V
applies the proposed rule to the facts of the post-Alliance contribution
action.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fraud as a Growing Concern
A recent journal article reveals frightening statistics about fraud in the
United States.
In 1985, property and casualty insurance fraud was estimated at $2 billion
per year. That figure has grown significantly over the years. By 1995, property
and casualty insurance fraud had risen to $20 billion, while health care fraud
accounted for $95 billion, each roughly 10 percent of claims paid. In one of the
few formal studies conducted, Massachusetts found that 32 percent of the total
number of claims studied contained an element of fraud. An Insurance
Research Council study estimates that 36 percent of all bodily injury liability
claims appear to involve fraud or buildup. It is generally conceded by industry
experts that 10 to 25 percent of all property-casualty claims are frauqulent.
However, insurers discover only about 20 percent of their fraud problems.
This same source states that fraud is growing in both frequency and
sophistication.8 The insurance industry has responded with various
measures to crack down on the problem, "including examinations under
oath, independent medical examinations, surveillance, and joint sting
operations with law enforcement authorities."9  Nevertheless, the
business of fraud is thriving, apparently ranking second behind the illicit
drug industry in terms of illegal revenue.'" Such fraud takes a staggering
economic toll, comparable to "an annual visit by a Hurricane Andrew.""
Unfortunately, attorneys are in some cases a part of the problem. The
National Insurance Crime Bureau, for example, reports fifty-three fraud
charges involving attorneys in 1995 alone. 2 The Alliance demonstrates
how vulnerable our society is when crooked attorneys pursue collusive
fraud on the insurance industry. This painful truth demands a thoughtful
7. Edward J. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and Its Effects on the
hIsurance Industry, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 23, 23-24 (1997) (citations omitted).
8. See id. at 23.
9. Id. at 27.
10. Seeid. at23.
I1. Id. at 35.
12. See id. at 25-26.
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response. Given the proclivity for history to repeat itself, we must
evaluate and consider refining the legal system in anticipation of the
"next Alliance."
B. The Cumis Rule and the Alliance
The opportunity for attorney fraud received an unintended boost from
the 1984 decision of San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis
Insurance Society, Inc.'3 In that case, an insurer was called upon to
defend its insured against a range of claims, some of which were clearly
not covered under the insurer's policy.' 4 The insurance company elected
to defend under a "reservation of rights."'5 This meant that the insurer
would defend against all the claims, but reserved the right to seek
reimbursement for any expenses incurred relative to non-covered claims.
The court found that the attorney hired by the insurer to defend the
insured faced an impermissible conflict of interest.' 6  Under such
circumstances, the court held that either the insurer must obtain the
informed consent of the insured, or the insurer must provide independent
counsel (later termed Cumis counsel) to be selected by the insured."
Moreover, the court held that control of the independent counsel must
rest with the insured. Essentially, Cumis held that insurers choosing to
defend under a reservation of right must pay the cost of defense, but
must also substantially surrender control over the hired attorney.
The Cumis rule was subsequently refined and codified by the
California legislature in section 2860 of the California Civil Code. 9
Section 2860 provides that, absent an express waiver by the insured, an
insurer is required to provide independent counsel whenever the insurer
has a duty to defend which involves a conflict of interest." Other
provisions include the following: The insurer may require that Cumis
counsel "possess certain minimum qualifications."2' Cumis counsel
cannot demand a rate of pay greater than customary under the
13. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1984).
14. See id. at 498.
15. See id. at 496.
16. See id. at 506.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1998).
20. See id. § 2860(a).
21. Id. § 2860(c).
circumstances.22 Cumis counsel and the insurer must disclose to each
other all non-privileged information concerning the proceeding or
concerning any dispute over insurance coverage, with any claim of
privilege being "subject to in camera review."' Both Cumis counsel and
the insurer's counsel "shall be allowed to participate in all aspects of the
litigation."24 Finally, the statute indicates that no provision should be
read to diminish any duty of the insured to cooperate with the insurer.'
While the Cunis doctrine eliminated the evils of a potential conflict of
interest, it simultaneously created a fertile breeding ground for fraud.
Consider the following story, typical of the many schemes employed by
the Alliance.,6 A developer built and sold apartment buildings. Several
of these buildings developed problems involving surface cracking. The
Alliance saw an opportunity and moved quickly to secure representation.
First, one Alliance firm gained representation of the building buyer.
This firm carefully crafted claims against the developer, making sure
that some portion of these would implicate the developer's insurance.
The developer tendered defense of the suit to its insurer. The insurer
elected to defend under a reservation of rights and informed the
developer of his right to select counsel of his choice. Meanwhile,
another Alliance firm was waiting in the wings. This firm finagled its
appointment as the developer's Cumis counsel by actually paying the
developer for the opportunity.2 From this point or earlier, the developer
had become an accomplice in the Alliance scheme.
Having secured representation of both sides to the controversy, and,
enjoying substantial freedom from oversight by the insurer, the Alliance
proceeded to implement its criminal plan. Early in the proceedings, the
Alliance joined numerous additional parties to the litigation, with
Alliance firms securing representation whenever possible. A flurry of
counterclaims and cross-claims ensued. Then came an extensive and
protracted discovery phase. The Alliance took every opportunity to
complicate and ensnarl matters, and consistently over-billed both hours
and rates. In one noteworthy case, these tactics apparently produced $10
million in defense bills on a case that eventually settled for $1.5
million.28 Whenever the insurer would inquire about the legitimacy of
22. See id.
23. Id. § 2860(d).
24. Id. § 2860(f).
25. See id.
26. See DeBenedictis, supra note 1, at 59-65; Levin, supra note 3, at B3; Interview
with Robert K. Schraner, in San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 18, 1998). Schraner was defense
counsel in the post-Alliance contribution action cited supra note 6.
27. Apparently, payoff of the client was not uncommon. See DeBenedictis, supra
note 1, at 61.
28. See DeBenedictis, supra note 1, at 61.
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legal bills, the Cumis counsel would respond evasively, often invoking
the attorney-client privilege.29
Furthermore, the Alliance found it could intimidate insurers rather
easily. Whenever an insurer would challenge the work or billings of an
Alliance firm, the firm would quickly respond with threats of bad faith
litigation." These tactics were remarkably effective, as insurance
companies were unwilling to risk bad faith exposure. One success built
on another, and the Alliance expanded-both in the number of attorney
participants and in the number of cases infiltrated. The Alliance adopted
a hierarchical structure similar to other organized crime, with the
kingpin apparently receiving sixty percent of all Alliance revenues."
Eventually, however, the extraordinary greed of the Alliance proved to
be its downfall. The billings became so outrageous that some insurers
eventually became suspicious of an organized, fraudulent conspiracy.
Those insurers began sharing data to piece together the pattern of
abuse.32 A tip from an attorney who was solicited by the Alliance led to
the placement of an undercover attorney within Alliance circles.33 After
almost two years, a painstaking investigation led to the criminal
prosecution and conviction of many Alliance members. 4 An episode of
unprecedented fraud on insurance companies finally came to an end.35
The interesting legal issue arising from the aftermath of the Alliance
fraud proceeds from the refusal of one insurance company (the non-
29. See id. at 62.
30. See Interview with Robert K. Schraner, supra note 26.
31. See DeBenedictis, supra note 1, at 65.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 59.
34. See Levin, supra note 3, at B3.
35. An apt summary of the Alliance can be seen in the appellate court's decision
affnrming the conviction of the leader of the Alliance. The court wrote,
[I]t was established at trial that Stites had been the mastermind of a massive set
of breaches of professional responsibility and of the criminal law, the more
heinous because Stites was a lawyer and at least twelve other lawyers were his
principal confederates in carrying out the fraud. The mentality that sees law as
a business was here taken to a reductio ad absurdum-litigation was
unconscionably churned to make money for the lawyers. The essence of
Stites's scheme, repeated over and over again, was for Stites to control both
sides of suits in which insurance companies were paying for counsel, and to
assure that the plaintiffs' lawyers would not settle until the insurance
companies would no longer pay the costs of defendants' counsel. Stites's
network of lawyers was known as "the Alliance." According to the jury
verdict in this case, Stites's scams extracted at least $50 million from the
insurers in the period 1984 to 1987.
United States v. Stites, 56 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1995).
payer) to defend.36 Alliance firms had demanded that the non-payer
defend under circumstances very similar to those described above. The
non-payer refused, claiming that there was little evidence to support any
legitimate claim. Other insurers (the payers) felt compelled by the law
and the circumstances to defend under a reservation of rights. A few
years after so defending, the payers sought contribution of defense costs
from the non-payer. 7 The non-payer refused, claiming that there was
substantial evidence at the time of the original claims to indicate that
these claims were not legitimate.8 The payers insisted, however, that the
non-payer could not have known (or at least did not know) this at the
time, and therefore was not justified in refusing to defend.39 The payers
and the non-payer were not able to come to terms, and the payers
brought suit.'
36. See Interview with Robert K. Schraner, supra note 26.
37. While the payers sought contribution for both defense costs and the cost of
settlement, this Comment only concerns the contribution concerning defense costs.
38. Accordingly, the brief for the defendant non-payer in the actual contribution
action states,
In essence, rather than investigating the claims which would have
revealed what was going on at the outset and examining and auditing defense
bills as they came in (which would have quickly revealed their impropriety and
the nature of the scam being run), [the payers] chose simply to pay the bills in
their entirety and pass them through to the public paying their insurance
premiums or, alternatively, to other insurers.... [T]hese insurers would have
the judicial system make [the non-payer] responsible for their mistakes and the
ultimate banker for the Alliance's fraudulent activities.
Mediation Brief for U.S. Fire Ins. Co. at 21-22, New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. National Ben
Franklin, No. BC012590 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), aft'd, No. B101206 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 1998) (not published) (emphasis omitted). While the non-payer's brief
does not explicitly allege the knowing involvement of the insured, such an explicit
allegation by the non-payer constitutes a critical and limiting assumption of this
Comment.
39. Accordingly, the brief for the plaintiff payers in the actual contribution action
states,
[The non-payer] had the duty to defend the underlying cross-
complaints .... [It] now criticizes the manner in which [the payers] undertook
their contractual defense obligations. [It] has the audacity to claim that [the
payers] cannot establish the reasonableness of the defense billings... even
though [the non-payer] rejected the opportunity to participate in and direct the
defense of those same cross-complaints.
[The non-payer] apparently believes that its breach and refusal to assume
its contractual obligations to defend these cross-complaints now allows it to
apply 20/20 hindsight to those carriers who properly took up the burden in [the
non-payer's] stead.
Mediation Brief for New Hampshire Ins. Co. at 24, New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. National
Ben Franklin, No. BC012590 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), aff'd, No. B101206 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1998) (not published).
40. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. National Ben Franklin, No. BC012590 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), aff'd, No. B101206 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1998) (not
published). In this case, the payers sought reimbursement for both defense and
indemnity. As mentioned, this Comment only concerns the claim for reimbursement of
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C. The Duty to Defend
This section will begin with a brief discussion regarding terminology.
Insurance policies take two forms-liability policies and indemnity
policies.4 ' According to Black's Law Dictionary, "Liability insurance is
that form of insurance which indemnifies against liability on account of
injuries to the person or property of another."'42 Indemnity policies, on
the other hand, provide "indemnity against loss,"' with "indemnity"
meaning "reimbursement." A federal court explained, "A liability
policy provides coverage for a loss which the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay, whereas an indemnity policy provides coverage only
for those losses actually paid out by the insured."45  Accordingly,
indemnity policies protect insureds only through reimbursement for
specific losses actually incurred. 6 Indemnity policies can be third-party
insurance (affording protection against third-party claims) or they can be
first-party insurance (as in the case of a homeowner's fire insurance, for
example). 7 Both liability policies and indemnity policies which cover
third-party claims are presumed to cover legal defense costs for covered
claims but can be drafted to exclude such defense coverage. 4 Note that
an indemnity policy that provides for reimbursement of defense costs
does not thereby necessarily impose a duty to defend on the insurer.49
The term "indemnify"-not to be confused with "indemnity"--means
"[ito restore the victim of a loss, in whole or in part, by payment, repair,
or replacement."50 When an insured suffers an insurable loss, the insurer
assumes a duty to indemnify, regardless of the insurance form-liability
or indemnity.
The critical variable in the various policy forms available, for
defense costs. However, a favorable outcome on this issue for the non-payer would
generally preclude any liability for indemnity contribution-for reasons that will become
apparent.
41. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp.
597, 603 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 805 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 769.
45. Save Mart Supermarkets, 843 F. Supp. at 603.
46. See id.
47. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 179 (2d ed.
1995).
48. See Save Mart Supermarkets, 843 F. Supp. at 602-03.
49. See id. at 603.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990).
purposes of this Comment, is the role of the insurer regarding the
defense of the insured in the event of a third-party claim. An example
may be helpful. Suppose that Bill, Jane, Fred, and Mary each buy
insurance to protect their separate business endeavors. Bill buys liability
insurance which includes coverage for defense costs. Jane buys liability
insurance that does not cover defense costs. Fred buys indemnity
insurance which includes coverage of defense costs. Finally, Mary buys
indemnity insurance which excludes defense costs. Suppose Jack, a
third party, is injured in an incident for which all of the four insureds
were arguably negligent and may be personally liable. Assume also that
the alleged negligence is covered under all four policies. How will the
various policies work? Bill's insurer will assume responsibility for
Bill's defense, securing and paying counsel and other defense costs.
Jane must provide her own defense and will not be reimbursed for
defense costs. Fred must conduct and pay for his own defense, but will
be reimbursed for such costs. Finally, Mary must conduct and pay for
her own defense, with no right of reimbursement. All four insureds have
the same protection in the event that damages are awarded to Jack.
Ultimately, the critical distinction is whether the insured or the insurer
directly bears the responsibility and expense of mounting a competent
defense. Under those scenarios where the insurer bears this burden, the
insurer is said to have the duty to defend.
The foregoing discussion serves to outline the theoretical
configurations of third-party insurance. In reality, most third-party
insurance policies are liability policies, and these virtually always
include defense coverage." Moreover, an ambiguous liability policy
will be deemed to include defense coverage.52 However, the exact limit
of the duty to defend can become unclear when a claim arises which is
arguably completely outside the policy coverage. The California
Supreme Court addressed this issue in the 1966 case, Gray v. Zurich
Insurance Co.53 In Gray, a third party sued the insured for assault and
battery relating to an altercation between motorists. After the insured
lost the suit, he sued the insurer which had refused to defend on the
grounds that the nature of the claim fell within an exclusion for bodily
injury "caused intentionally by... the insured."' While the trial court
ruled for the insurer, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the insurer breached its duty to defend. 5 The court reasoned that the
5 1. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 11 1(a), at 729
&n.l (2d ed. 1996).
52. See Save Mart Supermarkets, 843 F. Supp. at 602.
53. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
54. Id. at 174.
55. See id. at 171.
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policy was sufficiently ambiguous to support a reasonable expectation of
defense coverage in such a suit.56 The court went on to explain why the
duty to defend and the duty to indemnify do not always go hand in hand.
At the threshold we note that the nature of the obligation to defend is itself
necessarily uncertain. Although insurers have often insisted that the duty arises
only if the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured, this very contention
creates a dilemma. No one can determine whether the third party suit does or
does not fall within the indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is
resolved; in the instant case, the determination of whether the insured engaged
in intentional, negligent or even wrongful conduct depended upon the judgment
in the [third party] suit, and, indeed, even after that judgment, no one could be
positive whether it rested upon a finding of plaintiff's negligent or his
intentional conduct. The carrier's obligation to indemnify inevitably will not be
defined tptil the adjudication of the very action which it should have
defended.
Current California law concerning the duty to defend was summarized
in the 1996 case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. National American
Insurance Co. of California." The court wrote,
The defense duty is not contingent upon indemnity liability, but is determined at
the outset of the underlying action by comparing the policy provisions with the
complaint allegations and any relevant extrinsic evidence to determine if there
is any potential of coverage under the policy. If there is, a defense is owed even
where ultimately il is determined there was no coverage and therefore no
indemnity liability.
Thus, the courts have held that, if there is any potential for coverage, the
insurer has a duty to defend." Also, as indicated, the duty cannot be
determined with the benefit of hindsight.6 But, extrinsic evidence can
61and should be used to prove or disprove the potential for coverage.
Note also that the duty to defend generally also protects the insured
against "groundless, false, or fraudulent claims." 63 A 1998 case citing
56. See id.
57. Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
58. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 (Ct. App. 1996).
59. Id. at 501.
60. See Vann v. Travelers Cos., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that, where there is the potential for coverage, summary judgment for the insurer on the
issue of coverage or the duty to defend is inappropriate).
61. See A-H Plating, Inc. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113,
116 (Ct. App. 1997).
62. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Cal.
1993).
63. Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 295 P.2d 19, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956);
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792,799 (Cal. 1993).
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Gray emphasized that the insurer must overcome a heavy burden,
explaining, "The duty to defend is excused only 'if the third party
complaint can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which could
bring it within the policy coverage." ' 6' Finally, note that the duty to
defend might arise by estoppel. Estoppel arises, for example, when an
insurer defends without a timely reservation of rights.6 Thus, an insurer
originally having no duty to defend can actually bring such an obligation
upon itself by commencing a defense without making a reservation of
rights.
Modem cases concerning the duty to defend have produced "rules of
interpretation" to clarify an insurer's obligation in difficult or
"borderline" cases. These rules generally give the benefit of any doubt
to the insured. First, the complaint against the insured will be "liberally
construed." 66  Second, ambiguous language in the written insurance
policy will be construed against the drafter of the policy-invariably the
insurer.67 Third, where appropriate, an insurance policy may be viewed
as an adhesion contract, and in such cases the reasonable expectation of
the insured will prevail over the express terms of the policy.' In any
64. Charles E. Thomas Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 579
(Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court,
861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176
n.15 (Cal. 1966))). Note that this case has taken some liberty in construing precedent.
The original words in Gray, and the later quotation in Montrose, did not say "only."
65. A 1980 California case cited precedent which states,
The general rule supported by the great weight of authority is that if a liability
insurer, with knowledge of a ground of forfeiture or noncoverage under the
policy, assumes and conducts the defense of an action brought against the
insured, without disclaiming liability and giving notice of its reservation of
rights, it is thereafter precluded in an action upon the policy from setting up
such ground of forfeiture or noncoverage. In other words, the insurer's
unconditional defense of an action brought against its insured constitutes a
waiver of the terms of the policy and an estoppel of the insurer to assert such
grounds.
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769,775-76 (4th Cir. 1964)).
Estoppel might also arise from bad faith. Accordingly, a Washington case held that an
insurer is estopped to deny coverage to an insured where the insurer has commenced a
defense and has proceeded to conduct the defense in a manner demonstrating bad faith.
See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 505 (Wash. 1992).
66. Michaelian v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 140 (Ct.
App. 1996). This rule makes sense given that modem pleading rules are generally
liberal, permitting claims that merely suggest a cause of action in vague, imprecise, or
incomplete language.
67. See ROBERT KETON & ALAN Wimiss, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3, at 628-29
(Student ed. 1988).
68. See Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72. The author of a treatise on insurance law has
attempted to explain the possible legal bases for the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
as follows.
When the insured's expectation is created by some kind of ambiguity or
[VOL. 36: 797, 1999] Contribution Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
case, the final determination of the duty to defend is said to be a matter
of law for the courts to decide.69
In some cases, an insured faces a mix of claims, with some falling
within insurance coverage and some falling outside insurance coverage.
In such a circumstance, the courts have determined that the insurer has a
duty to defend against all claims, covered or not, but may be reimbursed
for defense costs clearly and solely attributable to non-covered claims' "
This right of reimbursement may be quite illusory, however, as the
following excerpt from one commentator suggests.
As a general rule, where an insurer has a duty to defend, it must defend all
allegations if any claim is potentially covered under the policy. The only
exception to this general rule is where the expenses are clearly allocable. In
order to establish allocability, the insurer must produce "undeniable evidence
supporting an allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a
noncovered claim." This ["]undeniable evidence["] requirement is extremely
difficult to meet and will very rarely warrant the allocation of defense expenses.
In fact, in those cases which discuss this exception to the rule of a full defense,
no insurer has beelable to meet the requirements outlined by the court to obtain
such an allocation.
Thus, while reimbursement for non-covered claims is theoretically
obtainable, reimbursement will be denied in most cases due to the
impracticability of apportionment.
7 2
The discussion above might suggest that an insurer's duty to defend
vagueness in the policy's language, syntax, or organization, something like the
doctrine of contra proferentum (construe the writing against the drafter) is
operating. When the insured's expectation comes from some assertion by an
agent of the insurer or through the insurer's advertising, something like the
doctrine of misrepresentation or deceit is operating. When the insured's
expectation is grounded in an assumption that coverage for the loss in question
would exist given the amount of premium charged, something like the doctrine
of unconscionability is operating. When the insured's expectation is part and
parcel of the insured's sudden surprise and dismay at the absence of coverage,
something like the doctrine of mistake is operating. When the insured's
expectation comes from the insurer's invitation to the insured to place trust in
the insurer that the insured's coverage needs will be satisfactorily met,
something like an estoppel or reliance theory is operating.
JERRY, supra note 51, § 25D, at 144-45 (footnotes omitted).
69. See Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal. v. Flores, 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 18, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1996).
70. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766,775-78 (Cal. 1997).
71. Lynn Haggerty King & Heidi Loken Benas, The Duty to Defend: When Does It
Exist and What Damages Are Recoverable for Its Breach?, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 245, 261
(1994) (citations omitted).
72. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1989).
has no limit. Modem courts, however, have held otherwise.73 Where a
claim clearly falls beyond all areas of coverage, the insurer has no duty
to defend.74 Stated differently, where there is no potential for coverage,
there is no duty to defend.75 Accordingly, courts have often found that
there is no duty to defend what is purely an intentional act when policy
language clearly confines coverage to "accidents."7 6 Thus, even though
an insurance policy may specifically provide protection against
groundless and fraudulent claims, the duty to defend is still limited to
"actions of the nature and kind covered by the policy."77 Note also that
public policy can preclude coverage (e.g., for criminal activity), thereby
ruling out any duty to defend.78 Finally, notwithstanding the favored
status of the insured, the California Supreme Court in 1995 rejected an
assertion that uncertainty-either regarding policy coverage or regarding
a legal question-alone gives rise to the duty to defend.79
Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, insurers do not enjoy a
grace period whereby the duty to defend is held in abeyance pending an
investigation to determine the validity of claims.0 In so holding, the
courts have expressed a concern that affording any such grace period
would discourage insurers from promptly fulfilling their contractual
duties.8' A California court explained as follows:
"[T]he duty to defend begins when a potential for coverage arises, and the duty
continues until the insurer proves otherwise.... [A] declaratory judgment of no
coverage, either by summary judgment or after trial, does not retroactively
relieve the.., insurer of the duty to defend. It only plieves the insurer of the
obligation to continue to defend after the declaration."
The same court went on to explain,
73. See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 628 (Cal. 1995); Gray v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 175 (Cal. 1966).
74. See Gray, 419 P.2d at 176 n.15.
75. See Oliver Mach. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
691, 696 (Ct. App. 1986).
76. See Dykstra v. Foremost Ins. Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 543-45 (Ct. App.
1993). The court wrote, "Since insurance is designed to protect against contingent or
unknown risks of harm, rather than harm that is certain or expected, it is well settled that
intentional or fraudulent acts are deemed purposeful rather than accidental and,
therefore, are not covered under a [commercial general liability] policy." Id. at 545
(citations omitted).
77. Gray, 419 P.2d at 175.
78. See Waller, 900 P.2d at 626.
79. See id. at 632.
80. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 791 F.
Supp. 1079, 1086 (D. Md. 1992).
81. See id.
82. Haskel, Inc., v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 527-28 (Ct. App. 1995)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 32, 35-36 (Ct. App. 1994)).
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Such a rule does not unfairly burden an insurer who disputes coverage. While
an insured may obtain an early summary adjudication of a defense obligation,
the insurer is entitled to seek a contrary ruling at any time it acquires the
requisite evidence to conclusively eliminate any potential for coverage.
There are several possible grounds for withdrawal by the insurer after
the duty to defend has attached.' First, the insurer that has reserved the
right to withdraw upon a determination of non-coverage may do so when
it subsequently establishes such non-coverage." Note, however, that an
insurer defending in a "mixed" case, involving both covered and non-
covered claims, cannot always withdraw after the covered claims are
settled-at least where the insured reasonably expects continued
coverage.86 Note also that when termination is based on a determination
of non-coverage, the evidence of non-coverage must consist of
"undisputed facts which conclusively eliminate a potential for
liability."' Second, the insurer may withdraw if it has been prejudiced
by the substantial and material non-cooperation of the insured." Third,
there is some support for the proposition that the insurer may withdraw
once it exhausts the indemnity limit in the policy, but only when the
policy clearly so provides."
The remedies for breach of the duty to defend have been summarized
in a legal journal, as follows:
At the least, an insurer's erroneous refusal to furnish a defense will
constitute a breach of contract. Under a contract measure of damages, the
insured is entitled to receive only those amounts due under the policy plus any
other consequential damages foreseeable when the contract was entered into.
"Where there is no opportunity to compromise the claim and the only wrongful
act of the insurer is the refusal to defend, the liability of the insurer is ordinarily
limited to the amount of the policy plus attorneys' fees and costs."
If there is a determination that only the duty to defend was breached, and
there was in fact no obligation to indemnify the underlying claim, the insured's
damages may be limited to those costs incurred in defense of the underlying
suit. These consequential damages will include litigation expenses, attorneys'
fees and other defense costs.
83. Id. at 528.
84. See King & Benas, supra note 71, at 262.
85. See id.
86. See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811 (CL App. 1984).
87. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 1993).
88. See Valladao v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 89 P.2d 643, 647 (Cal. 1939).
89. See JERRY, supra note 51, § 111(2), at 746-50. Jerry cautions, however,
"Currently, the question of whether the duty to defend can be discharged by fulfilling the
duty to indemnify is a confused one in insurance law." Id. at 750.
90. King & Benas, supra note 71, at 264-65 (citations omitted) (quoting Comunale
The same article goes on to discuss the extra-contractual liability which
can arise if the court finds a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.9' This area of the law is discussed below in Part lI.D.
Finally, note that, once the duty to defend is found to apply, the
insurer may be required to provide Cumis counsel, as previously
discussed in Part Il.B.92
D. Bad Faith Law
1. Introduction
There is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealings that applies
universally to all contracts. 3 Accordingly, an insurance policy, a form
of contract, imposes such a duty on both the insurer and the insured.94 In
general, breach of this duty by an insurer constitutes "bad faith."95 A
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958)).
91. See id. at 265.
92. See infra Part II.B.
93. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRAcTS § 205
(1981).
94. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 128 (1994) [hereinafter Richmond, An
Overview].
95. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 139 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Grainger, Ala., 461 So. 2d 1320, 1327 (Ala. 1984)); see also Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 557 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982). This definition should be qualified by
the comment of a treatise author on insurance law, who wrote, "Indeed, 'good faith' and
'bad faith' remain elusive concepts with no universally accepted definition." JERRY,
supra note 51, § 25G, at 151. Note, in particular, that in California the Black's definition
of bad faith may be inadequate, for reasons discussed in the ensuing paragraph of the
main text.
Perhaps an understanding of bad faith and its relevancy to the issues of this Comment
can be advanced by Figure A, infra page 816. The diagram depicts a continuum
representing the certainty of the obligation to perform (i.e., to defend, settle, or
indemnify) under various factual circumstances. In the area depicted by the left side of
the diagram, there is great certainty that, under the law, the insured's demand on the
insurer would not prevail. This outcome might reflect either an absence of coverage or a
policy deemed to have become void. Thus, an insurer is fully justified in denying
coverage in the "Clearly no duty to perform" zone. In the zone depicted in the middle
and labeled the "gray area," there is genuine uncertainty as to the insurer's legal
obligation. This uncertainty might involve a factual question, a legal question, or some
combination of the two. Denial of coverage by the insurer in the gray area raises
potentially difficult legal issues. Finally, in the area depicted by the right side of the
diagram, there is great certainty, under the law, that the insured's demand on the insurer
must prevail. Failure by the insurer to perform in the "Clearly a duty to perform" zone
would generally constitute bad faith. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 572
(Ariz. 1986) (stating that an insurer's rejection of a claim demonstrates bad faith unless
coverage is "fairly debatable").
Bad faith law is relevant to the contemplated contribution action only because of the
overlap of issues involved in bad faith and the duty to defend. These include the
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cause of action for bad faith traditionally lay in contract.96 More
recently, however, the offense has been characterized as a tort,
significantly enhancing the damages available.97  The modem
characterization reflects the view that contractual remedies may be
inadequate to deter coercion of the insured by the insurer.9 As one court
explained,
When coverage and liability are established.., a game of the strong against the
weak can begin. A... valid and legitimate [claim] can be settled for far less
than its actual value if the need for funds by the victim is great enough and the
insurance company is obstigate enough to use its knowledge of that fact to force
acceptance of a lesser sum.
following: (1) Is there a "gray area" at all? (2) If there is a "gray area," what are its
boundaries? (3) To what extent does the insurer enjoy the discretion to deny coverage in
the "gray area"? (4) When, if ever, will an insurer commit bad faith in denying coverage
in the "gray area"? (5) What extracontractual penalties might be imposed for the
wrongful denial of coverage in the "gray area"? (6) To what extent does the threat of
bad faith provide an effective incentive to an insurer to perform according to its duty?
And, finally, (7) Under what circumstances can a bad-faith breach of the duty to defend
trigger liability also for a breach of the duty to settle and the duty to indemnify? These
questions are implicit in the discussion in Part III and Part IV.
96. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 77.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 78. Commentators have debated the merit of this view. For a brief
summary of the debate, see JERRY, supra note 51, § 25G, at 155.
99. Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 79 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 578 (9th
Cir. 1992). Some interesting analogies might be drawn between bad faith law and
products liability law. (1) Causes of action in both areas have their genesis in a
contractual context, but have nonetheless evolved into independent torts. (The tort
characterization of products liability can be traced to the landmark case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).) (2) The arguments offered for the tort-
characterization of bad faith resemble those offered for the tort-characterization of
products liability. Accordingly, in both contexts, the arguments refer to problems of
externalities, poorly informed consumers, and unequal bargaining power. (3) In both
areas, the law has developed strong presumptions in favor of the victim. (4) A bad faith
claim might be characterized as a products liability claim, with the defective product
being the insurance policy. Interestingly, a few cases have invoked the theory of the
implied warranty of fitness within an insurance context. See JERRY, supra note 51, §
25F, at 150-51. (5) In both areas, the legitimate question arises as to whether contract
law is actually inadequate and, if so, why. Stated in terms used by "law and economics"
scholars: Is there a market failure that demands corrective intervention? For such a
discussion in the context of bad faith, see Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of
Contract By First Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 416-21 (1996). (6) Likewise,
in both areas the law must implicitly decide which tort regime prevails-joint care or
alternative care. (As explained in lectures by Professor Christopher Wonnell at the
University of San Diego, the joint care regime should prevail when avoidance of the
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FIGURE A
INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND, SETTLE, OR INDEMNIFY
Clearly no I; ty;o :
duty to perform i ri fe , ,
Denial of coverage "Gray area" Denial of coverage
does not constitute constitutes
bad faith bad faith
California case law suggests that there are three categories of insurer
misconduct. The first is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing that falls short of the more reprehensible conduct connoted by
"bad faith." The California Supreme Court in 1975 explained,
Several cases, in considering the liability of the insurer, contain language to
the effect that bad faith is the equivalent of dishonesty, fraud, and
concealment.... The language used in the cases, however, should not be
understood as meaning that in the absence of evidence establishing actual
dishonesty, fraud, or concealment no recovery may be had for a judgment in
excess of the policy limits.... Liability [may be] imposed not [only] for a bad
faith breach of the contraloobut [also] for failure to meet the duty to accept
reasonable settlements ....
A few months later, the same court wrote, "[Ain insurer's 'good faith,'
though erroneous, belief in noncoverage affords no defense to [extra-
contractual] liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a
reasonable settlement offer."'0 ' Thus, in California, extra-contractual
harm is achieved most efficiently by requiring both the plaintiff and the defendant to take
precautions. By contrast, an alternative care regime should prevail when avoidance of
the harm is achieved most efficiently by requiring only one party-the lowest-cost
avoider-to take appropriate precautions.) Stated differently, the question is whether an
optimal legal rule should produce incentives affecting plaintiff behavior. Again, Sykes
addresses this issue in connection with bad faith, questioning whether the prevailing bad-
faith regime "does little to police misconduct while doing much to cause uneconomic
increases in the premiums that policyholders must pay." Id. at 443.
100. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Cal. 1967).
101. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744, 748
(Cal. 1975). Note that the extra-contractual liability for failure to accept a reasonable
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liability normally associated with bad faith can attach even in the
absence of bad faith.'02  Commentators analyzing bad faith have
sidestepped this inconvenient result by characterizing such lesser
offenses as negligence-based bad faith.03 This approach appears to be
both accurate and sensible, and will be adopted herein.
Two other categories of insurer misbehavior (in addition to
negligence-based bad faith) can be deduced from a case 4 that explained
section 3294 of the California Civil Code as follows: "In order to
establish that an insurer's conduct has gone sufficiently beyond mere
bad faith to warrant a punitive award, it must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the insurer has acted maliciously, oppressively
or fraudulently."'' 5 This Comment will refer to bad faith warranting
punitive damages as "MOF bad faith" (MOF deriving from
"maliciously, oppressively or fraudulently"). This Comment will refer
to the "mere" bad faith not warranting punitive damages as "knowing
bad faith." Having deduced and labeled these three categories-
negligent bad faith, knowing bad faith, and MOF bad faith-this
Comment will henceforth speak of the "severity" of bad faith by
reference to one of these three categories.
Insurer bad faith can occur in the context of either first-party insurance
or third-party insurance." Third-party insurance is liability or
indemnity insurance that affords protection in the event of liability to a
third party.' °' First-party insurance, by contrast, is indemnity insurance
that protects the insured against hazards such as ill health, property
damage, or property loss.' 8 Insurer bad faith occurring in the context of
first-party insurance is sometimes called "first-party bad faith"; likewise,
that occurring in the context of third-party insurance is sometimes called
"third-party bad faith."'O' Note, however, that this terminology is not
settlement offer consists of a lifting of the policy limits. See Brown v. Guarantee Ins.
Co., 319 P.2d 69, 70-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328
P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
102. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 98 (citing Mock v. Michigan
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 1992)).
103. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 98; see also Sykes, supra note
99, at 411.
104. Mock, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594.
105. Id. at 607.
106. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 80.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 103.
109. Id.
used consistently and in any case may be misleading. The terminology
is subject to inconsistent use because a court or a commentator will
sometimes refer to any allegation of bad faith made by the insured
against the insurer as first-party bad faith."0  The terminology is
misleading because "third-party bad faith" seems to erroneously suggest
a cause of action generally enjoyed by third-party plaintiffs."' In fact, a
third party generally has no private right of action against an insurer
under California law." 2 In the interest of clarity, this Comment will
speak of "third-party-insurance bad faith" and "first-party-insurance bad
faith."
2. Third-Party-Insurance Bad Faith
A third-party-insurance bad faith action can potentially arise from a
breach of the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify, or the duty to
settle."' The genesis of the modem California tort of third-party-
insurance bad faith can be traced to Brown v. Guarantee Insurance
Co.," 4 a 1957 case involving a breach of the duty to settle. Brown sued
Weisenberg for damages arising from an automobile accident."5
Guarantee Insurance Company assumed the defense of Weisenberg, its
insured, but refused Brown's offer to settle for $5000."I6 Subsequently, a
jury awarded Brown $15,000 in damages, after which Guarantee paid
the policy limit of $5000 to Brown.' 7 Weisenberg was unable to pay the
balance of the judgment and declared bankruptcy."' The bankruptcy
court assigned any rights of Weisenberg under the Guarantee policy to
Brown, after which Brown sued Guarantee for bad faith in refusing to
settle."9 After the trial court sustained a demurrer by the defendant, 2 '
110. Accordingly, in an opinion ordered not published, a trial court was quoted as
(and criticized for) referring to third-party-insurance bad-faith as "first party bad faith."
Messersmith v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 884 (Ct. App. 1995)
(opinion ordered not published).
11. Third-party plaintiffs did enjoy a direct cause of action in California for almost
ten years, beginning with the famous California Supreme Court case of Royal Globe
hIsurance Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). This rule, which came from
the era of Chief Justice Rose Bird, was overruled by the California Supreme Court in
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). The author
of an insurance-law treatise points out that the rule from Royal Globe "had virtually no
following outside California." JERRY, supra note 51, § 25, at 124.
112. See Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 61-68 (overruling Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at
329).
113. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 88-89.




118. See id. at 7 1.
119. Seeid. at70-71.
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the appellate court reversed, holding that Guarantee could be found
liable for damages resulting from its refusal to settle.121  The court
explained its reasoning as follows:
"It is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judgment upon the question
of whether the claim should be settled or contested. But because it has taken
over this duty... its exercise of this right should be accompanied by
considerations of good faith."
... 'Although the company, in dealing with the situation, has a pight to
consider its own interests, it has no right to sacrifice those of the insured.
The 1958 case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.'s
involved both a breach of the duty to settle and a breach of the duty to
defend. Mr. and Mrs. Comunale sued a driver named Sloan who struck
them while they were on foot. 24 Sloan had an insurance policy with a
company called Traders with coverage limits of $10,000 per individual
and $20,000 per accident."z Traders refused to defend Sloan, asserting
that policy coverage did not apply because Sloan was driving another
person's vehicle.' 6 During the trial, the Comunales offered to settle for
$4000." Sloan insisted that Traders was liable under the policy and
urged the company to accept the settlement offer." After Traders
refused, a jury awarded damages of $25,000 to Mr. Comunale and $1250
to Mrs. Comunale. 29 Sloan did not pay, and the Comunales sued
Traders under a provision of the policy authorizing an injured party to
collect on judgments covered by the policy."' The court determined that
coverage applied and awarded the policy limits to the Comunales. 3'
Later, having obtained an assignment of rights from Sloan, the
Comunales sued Traders again, this time for the damage award in excess
120. See id. at 70.
121. See id.at 71.
122. Id. at 73-74 (quoting 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171-72). Note that the Brown court
declined to classify the claim as arising in tort or in contract, claiming any such effort
"would be fruitless." Id. at 77.
123. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).








of the policy limits.' The jury ruled in favor of the Comunales, but the
trial judge entered a judgment for Traders notwithstanding the verdict.'33
In reversing the trial court, the California Supreme Court discussed the
duty to settle and the duty to defend.
When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most
reasonable manner of disposing [of] the claim is a settlement which can be
made within those limits, a consideration in good faith of the insured's interest
requires the insurer to settle the claim. Its unwarranted refusal to do so
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
... An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and, although
its position may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be
wrongful it is liable for the full amount which will Spmpensate the insured for
all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach ....
At the end of the opinion in Comunale, the court specifically endorsed
the view that the wrongful refusal to settle constitutes a tort.'35
A recent and instructive case involving a breach of the duty to defend
is Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. 36  Mercury provided insurance
coverage for a particular Renault automobile and various potential
drivers.' Amato was a covered driver who drove the Renault
negligently and thereby injured a passenger named Sutton.' When
Sutton sued Amato, Mercury refused to defend, asserting that a policy
exclusion precluded coverage for Sutton because she was a resident
relative of the insured.'39 Lacking funds, Amato did not defend and
Sutton was awarded a default judgment for $167,750.140 Sutton then
sued Mercury, seeking payment on the judgment.4' Amato also sued
Mercury, alleging a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 2 The trial court (Amato 1) found that Sutton was in fact a
resident relative and therefore ruled against Sutton.' At the same time,
however, the court found that Mercury had in fact breached its duty to
defend and ordered Mercury to pay Amato the full amount of the
underlying judgment."' The holding was based on a finding that there




135. See id. at 203.
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Amato.' The appellate court affirmed Mercury's liability, but held that
damages should be limited to the costs of litigation. 146 On remand, the
trial court (Amato II) determined that Amato incurred no litigation costs
(due to his choice not to contest the charges) and therefore awarded
judgment to Mercury. 47 In reviewing Amato II, the appellate court
reversed again, this time holding that the trial court outcome in Amato I
was the correct outcome after all. 48 The court justified its flip-flop by
citing the "significant new case law" established after Amato I.14  In
holding Mercury liable for the full amount of the underlying judgment,
the court wrote,
It may seem quixotic that Sutton is denied recovery on her direct action on the
policy but Amato is entitled to recover for Mercury's failure to defend.
However, the distinction is explainable by the difference in the nature of their
respective claims. Sutton's claim depends on the contract terms of the coverage
provisions of the insurance policy, whereas Amatq;5 claim is based on the
application of the judicially expanded duty to defend.
A bad-faith breach of the duty to defend can also occur in the conflict-
of-interest context discussed earlier in Part .3B.15' A commentator
explains,
Defense counsel's dual representation in third-party actions may spawn later
first-party bad faith claims.... When a conflict of interest arises and defense
counsel advances the insurer's interests to the insured's detriment, the insurer is
guilty of... bad faith....
The most common conflict of interest arises where an insurer defends under
a reservation of rights. There always exists the possibility that a liability insurer
that reserves its rights has a diminished interest in its insured's defense .... A
conflict certainly arises... if counsgJ hired by the insurer can control the
outcome of attendant coverage issues.
We have seen third-party-insurance bad faith in connection with the
duty to settle (Brown) and the duty to defend (Comunale, Amato). As
mentioned earlier, third-party-insurance bad faith can also arise when an




148. See id. at 913.
149. See id. at 915. The court was referring to Montrose Chemical Corp. v.
Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287 (1993), which was "decided shortly after Amato L" Id.
150. Id. at 918.
151. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 112-13.
152. Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
153. See id. at 88.
such breach includes unreasonable delay," 4 failure to investigate, 55 or
the attempting to compel an insured to contribute to settlement.156 The
breach of the duty to indemnify is discussed in further detail in the
context of first-party-insurance bad faith below.
3. First-Party-Insurance Bad Faith
While third-party-insurance bad faith might involve the duty to settle,
the duty to defend, or the duty to indemnify, first-party-insurance bad
faith simply concerns the duty to indemnify.'57  However, as a
commentator explains, this duty may be breached by a variety of insurer
conduct, including "deceptive practices or deliberate misrepresentations
to avoid paying claims, inadequate investigation, deliberate
misinterpretation of records or policy language to avoid coverage,
unreasonable litigation conduct, and unreasonable delay in resolving a
claim."'58
The development of first-party-insurance bad faith claims trailed that
of third-party-insurance bad faith,"9 and a minority of jurisdictions still
does not recognize first-party-insurance bad faith.l ° In such minority
jurisdictions, contract law provides any and all remedies for a breach of
duty by the insurer.' 6' The majority of jurisdictions, however, has
deemed contract law inadequate, acknowledging first-party-insurance
bad faith as an independent tort. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
articulated a three-part rationale,'63 which might be rephrased as
generally encompassing concerns about externalities, frustration of the
contract purpose, and inequality of bargaining power.64  First,
externalities occur because the public has a distinct interest in the good-
faith performance of insurers. The idea is that, when an insurer fails to
so perform, society-not just the insured-suffers harm.65  Second,
because insurance contracts are highly technical, the protection
bargained for by the consumer can be unfairly denied on the basis of an
154. See id. at 99.
155. See icL at 101.
156. See id. at 103.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 111-12 (citations omitted).
159. See id. at 104.
160. See Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's Bad Faith as Shield or Sword: Litigation
Relief for Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 41, 49-50 (1993) [hereinafter Richmond, Shield
or Sword].
161. See id. at 49.
162. See id. at 49-50.
163. See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (Neb. 1991).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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obscure technicality.' Finally, the insured is thought to deal from a
position of weakness relative to the insurer, particularly when a
significant loss occurs.' 6
A first-party-insurance bad faith cause of action was first embraced by
the California Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co. 68 Gruenberg was charged with arson in connection with
fire damage at a restaurant he owned.69  Gruenberg's insurer, Aetna,
demanded that, in accordance with policy provisions, Gruenberg appear
for an examination under oath.7° Gruenberg's attorney sent a written
response requesting that any examination be deferred until the criminal
proceedings were completed.' Aetna refused the request, indicating
that Gruenberg's failure to comply with Aetna's request would void the
policy.' Several weeks later, the arson charge was dropped for lack of
evidence. Gruenberg's attorney then indicated that Gruenberg was
available for examination, but Aetna replied that the policy had already
become void. 74 Gruenberg sued Aetna, claiming that Aetna had
conspired to deny Gruenberg his rightful coverage under the policy.'
The trial court sustained Aetna's demurrer.76 The California Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that Gruenberg had
stated a proper cause of action, notwithstanding Gruenberg's failure to
strictly comply with the contractual provisions regarding Aetna's right
of examination. '7I The court explained,
While it might be argued that defendants would be excused from their
contractual duties (e.g., obligation to indemnify) if plaintiff breached his
obligations under the policies, we do not think that plaintiffs alleged breach
excuses defendants from their duty, implied by law, of good faith and fair
dealing. In other words, the insurer's duty is uncondjonal and independent of
the performance of plaintiff's contractual obligations.
The court specifically held that a breach of the duty of good faith and
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
169. See id. at 1034.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1034-35.




176. See id. at 1035-36.
177. See id. at 1042.
178. Id. at 1040 (footnote omitted).
fair dealing in the context of first-party insurance creates a cause of
action in tort.'79
The 1992 case of Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co.'
dealt with an unreasonable delay of benefits. Mock was the owner of a
$1,500,000 home on the cliffs of Palos Verdes which he underinsured,
the policy having a limit of $139,500.8' The homes in Mock's
neighborhood suffered damages from earth movement caused by the
City's negligent installation and maintenance of a storm drain.1  While
Mock's home itself showed only minimal physical damage, there was
evidence that the home value had declined by roughly $600,000 due to
the pervasive effect of the City's error.'83 When the insurer stalled for no
apparent reason, Mock sued.'4 Several months after the suit was filed,
the insurer made payment of the policy limit but attempted to force
Mock to assign to it "first-dollar" subrogation rights against the City.'
The appellate court upheld a jury verdict finding that both the
unreasonable delay and the attempt to force the assignment constituted
breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.8 '
In the context of first-party insurance, the California courts have
recited various limitations on bad-faith actions. Accordingly, "there are
at least two separate requirements to establish breach of the implied
covenant: (1) benefits due under the policy must have been withheld;
and (2) the reason for withholding benefits must have been unreasonable
or without proper cause."' 7 As one commentator stated, "A reasonable
insurer has a right to be wrong."'88 Likewise, an insurer may litigate an
open legal question without incurring bad faith exposure." 9 Stated
differently, "bad faith liability cannot be imposed where there 'exist[s] a
genuine issue as to [the insurer's] liability under California law.""" °
Finally, note that much of the law regarding first-party-insurance bad
faith has been codified by statute in California."'
179. See id. at 1037.
180. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Ct. App. 1992).
181. See id. at 597.
182. See id.
183. See id. at598.
184. See id. at 600-01.
185. See id. at 602.
186. See id. at 615. In this case the jury awarded punitive damages of $460,350, but
the appellate court found error in the jury instructions concerning punitive damages and
remanded for a new trial on damages only. See id.
187. Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 255 (Ct. App. 1990).
188. Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 109.
189. See id. at 110-11.
190. Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting
Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 357 (1991) (review granted),
citing Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1982)).
191. See CAL. INs. CODE § 790.03 (West 1993).
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4. Remedies
Remedies for bad faith include the traditional contractual remedies
and the extracontractual remedies reflecting the modem tort-
characterization of bad-faith conduct.'2 Traditional contractual remedies
consist primarily of expectations damages and economic losses, to the
extent foreseeable.'93 Tort remedies for bad faith include both economic
and non-economic damages (including emotional distress), and, under
certain circumstances, punitive damages.1 4  Section 3294 of the
California Civil Code specifies the law regarding punitive damages and
has been summarized by a California court as follows:
Evidence that an insurer has violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing
does not thereby... justify an award of punitive damages. In order to establish
that an insurer's conduct has gone sufficiently beyond mere bad faith to warrant
a punitive award, it must be shown by clear and convinc{f evidence that the
insurer has acted maliciously, oppressively or fraudulently.
The specific remedies available in any given case of bad faith depend
on the type of duty breached (e.g., the duty to defend versus the duty to
indemnify) and the severity of the breach (i.e., negligent breach,
knowing breach, or MOF breach). Figure B, on page 826, classifies the
types of bad faith (by the duty breached and the severity of the breach)
and lists the corresponding remedies. As mentioned earlier, victims of
insurer bad faith can obtain both contractual and extracontractual
remedies, including, in some cases, punitive damages. When assessed,
punitive damages can provide quite a wallop-sometimes in the
hundreds of millions of dollars.196 But, even in the absence of punitive
damages, bad-faith insurers face other significant extracontractual
penalties. An insurer, for example, that breaches its duty to defend must
generally reimburse all defense costs in the suit, regardless of the
potential for coverage, and forfeits any right for reimbursement of
defense costs pertaining to non-covered claims."" Likewise, as in
Amato, an insurer breaching its duty to defend can be held liable for the
full amount of any judgment, up to the policy limits-even if it was
192. See Sykes, supra note 99, at 408.
193. See id. at 408-09.
194. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 79-80.
195. Mock v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App.
1992) (citations omitted).
196. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 75.
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ultimately determined by the court that no indemnity coverage existed.'98
An insurer breaching its duty to settle faces even greater exposure, being
liable for judgments even in excess of the policy limits.' Finally, the
victim of insurer bad faith enjoys the full array of tort remedies (e.g., for
emotional distress).2" Collectively, these extracontractual remedies-
both punitive and other-provide a powerful incentive for insurers to act
properly toward insureds.
5. Comparative Bad Faith and Reverse Bad Faith
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to both the insurer and
the insured.2°' This reciprocity forms the basis for the new concept of
comparative bad faith, which was first explicitly discussed in California
in the 1984 case of Fleming v. Safeco Insurance Co.202 In Fleming, the
insured sued the insurer for bad faith and prevailed. However, because
the jury found some bad faith on the part of the insured, the court
allowed the jury to offset from the award an amount corresponding to
the harm caused by the insured's bad faith203 A year later, this concept
received additional support in California Casualty General Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court.2°4 In that case, the defendant insurer was accused
of bad faith and wished to amend its answer by alleging bad faith on the
part of the insured. After the trial court denied the motion without
stating reasons, the appellate court reversed, writing,
[W]e are persuaded that in an appropriate case, an insured's breach of the
198. See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 914 (1997).
199. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
200. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 79-80.
201. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d 1038,
1041 (Cal. 1980).
202. 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Ct. App. 1984). The assertion that this case is the first to
explicitly discuss comparative bad faith in California is found in Kransco v. American
Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 548 (Ct. App. 1997) (Swager,
J., dissenting) (review granted).
203. See Fleming, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 315. Note that the issue of comparative bad
faith was not reviewed on appeal. Rather, the court wrote,
We note in passing that even comparing the bad faith of plaintiff with the bad
faith of Safeco appears to have no precedent, but since that portion of the
special verdict was utilized without any objection by either plaintiff or Safeco,
and no issue was raised concerning it on this appeal, we need not determine its
propriety.
Id. at 321.
204. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
827
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which contributes to an insurer's
failure to pursue or delay in pursuing the investigation and payment of a claim
may constitute at least a partial defense to the plaintiff's damage action for the
insurer's breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing ....
... 'We perceive no sound reason... why tbS doctrine of comparative
fault ... should not be applicable to bad faith cases.
Comparative fault in the context of bad faith surfaced again in the
1990 case of Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co.2 That case, however,
did not involve any alleged bad faith on the part of the insured, and thus
raised a different legal issue from that of California Casualty. In
Patrick, the insured suffered property damage to his roof, for which he
made a proper claim on his homeowner's policy.20 Because the insurer
did not pay promptly, the insured, a contractor by profession, resolved to
do the repair himself. 3 While accomplishing the job, the insured fell
from the roof and sustained serious bodily harm.' At trial, the insurer
was not allowed to assert the defense that the insured's negligence
contributed to the accident.1 The appellate court reversed, however,
holding that comparative fault is an appropriate defense-even when
comparing the defendant's bad faith with the plaintiff's negligence.2 '
The court rejected an "apples and oranges" objection, noting that
comparative fault had been upheld where the comparison was between
negligence and strict products liability.2  The court further explained,
The most arresting feature which emerges from our review of the major
comparative fault cases decided in the past 15 years is that, whenever the
Supreme Court or the courts of appeal have been presented with a case
affording an opportunity to expand the scope of 2Womparative fault principles
into new areas of tort law, the courts have done so.
This quotation from Patrick is no longer true, due to a divided
California appellate court which wholly disapproved of the comparative
bad faith defense in the 1997 case of Kransco v. American Empire
Surplus Lines Insurance Co. 214 While the California Supreme Court has
since granted review of this case to specifically evaluate the propriety of
205. Id. at 822-23.
206. 267 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990) (certified for partial publication).
207. See id. at 26.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 27.
211. See id. at 28.
212. See id. at 29-30. By this way of reasoning, the comparative bad faith defense
of California Casualty might be viewed as a species of comparative fault.
213. Id. at 30.
214. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 1997).
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comparative bad faith,25 the appellate court emphatically rejected the
reasoning of California Casualty.16 The appellate court began by noting
the limited precedent on the subject, writing, "Judicial approval of the
doctrine of comparative bad faith... rests exclusively upon intermediate
appellate court decisions. Significantly, no state Supreme Court has
embraced the doctrine, and the weight of authority is against it. '217 The
court then went on to assert,
The California Casualty court's recognition of the... comparative bad faith
defense does not survive close analysis .... [A]n insurer's breach of the
covenant of good faith.., is governed by tort principles .... An insured's
breach of the covenant is not a tort....
... This distinction between tort and contract convinced the Montana
Supreme Court to reject comparative bad faith: "the [..urer's] tort cannot be
offset comparatively by the [insureds'] contract breach."
The majority went on to assert that, if the doctrine of comparative bad
faith has any legitimacy, the defense must be strictly limited to cases
where the insured's conduct directly contributed to the insurer's bad-
faith conduct.219
After noting "a dearth of case law in California" concerning
comparative bad faith, " the dissent in Kransco insisted that the doctrine
is sound, arguing that,
[Tihe contractual underpinnings of the duty of the insured ... [are not]
antithetical to apportionment of damages based upon comparative bad faith, as
the majority opinion suggests....
... 'Comparative bad faith merely allocates loss in proportion to fault; it
does not deprive the insured of the benefit of the insurance bargain.... The
insured does not inst& against its own bad faith failure to abide by the terms of
the insurance policy.
While the status of comparative bad faith remains uncertain pending
the California Supreme Court's review of Kransco, the related notion of
"reverse bad faith" has not gained any support from the appellate courts
215. See Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 942 P.2d 414 (Cal.
1997). This is the citation to the California Supreme Court's granting of review.
216. See Kransco, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538. This is the appellate court case accepted
for review by the California Supreme Court.
217. Id. at 538 n.1 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
219. See id. at 542.
220. Id. at 548 (Swager, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 550-51, 553 (Swager, J., dissenting).
in California.2' The doctrine of reverse bad faith would give an insurer
a direct cause of action against the insured for any bad faith on the part
of the insured.2" Accordingly, the insurer might utilize a "sword" akin
to the "shield" of comparative bad faith.m While several commentators
have strenuously urged the adoption of the reverse bad faith cause of
actiont2 the courts remain steadfastly unpersuaded. A commentator
who favors a reverse bad faith remedy has summarized the reasons
generally cited for the courts' resistance:
[T]he reasons cited include: (1) "the insured, who often finds himself in dire
financial straits after the loss, must have the equal footing which is provided by
the ability to sue the insurer for bad faith;" (2) the insurer drafted the policy and
can refuse the insured's claim; (3) there are other avenues for the insurer to
pursue in the event that an insured submits a fraudulent claim, including a cause
of action against the insured for fraud; and (4) the insurer can have an adequate
remedy against an insured who files a friolous bad faith claim under a state
rule of civil procedure allowing sanctions. '
E. Contribution Law
Insurance companies may generally seek reimbursement from others
for payments made pursuant to their policies under three
circumstances.' The first form of reimbursement is called "equitable
subrogation."2 9 This would occur in the first-party setting, for example,
when a fire insurance company seeks reimbursement for a paid claim
from a third-party tortfeasor (or insurer thereof) who caused the fire
damage. The second form of reimbursement is called "equitable
indemnity."" This occurs in the third-party context when an insurer
seeks reimbursement from a third-party (or insurer thereof) who is
primarily liable for the loss.23 The third form of reimbursement is called
"equitable contribution," or "contribution" for shortY2 An insurance
222. See Schrenk & Palmquist, supra note 7, at 30.
223. See Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 134.
224. See Richmond, Shield or Sword, supra note 160, at 41.
225. See Cathryn M. Little, Fighting Fire with Fire: "Reverse Bad Faith" in First-
Party Litigation hvolving Arson and Insurance Fraud, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 43, 66
(1996); Richmond, An Overview, supra note 94, at 139-40; Schrenk & Palmquist, supra
note 7, at 30-31.
226. See Cathryn M. Little, supra note 225, at 46 (reporting that "the limited
number of jurisdictions which have directly addressed the issue.., have declined to
recognize [a reverse-bad-faith cause of action]").
227. Id. at 46-47 (citations omitted).
228. See CAL. PRAc. GUIDE INS. Lrr. ch. 9, § B, at 9:7 (1998).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. ch. 9, §B, at9:8.
232. Id. ch. 9, § B, at 9:11.
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practice guide explains, "Where several insurers insure the same risk and
each insurer is primarily liable for any loss, and one pays the entire loss,
the action between them is one for equitable contribution" ' 3 The issues
of this Comment concern this third area-equitable contribution.2'
The doctrines of contribution and subrogation are often confused-
even by the courts. 5 Understanding the difference between the two,
however, can be critical. Consider, for example, the 1998 case of
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.3 6  In
Fireman's, an insured was sued and tendered defense to two primary
insurers, Fireman's and Maryland. 7 Fireman's agreed to defend under a
reservation of rights, but Maryland refused to defend * s  After this
underlying case was settled, the insured sued Maryland for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.*.9 In settling with the insured, Maryland obtained a release from
any further claims regarding its failure to defend."4 Fireman's, who did
not join or intervene in the breach-of-duty case, then sued Maryland for
equitable contribution.' Maryland defended by asserting that there
could be no action for contribution given the release it obtained from the
insured.f 2 The appellate court held that "contribution and subrogation
are entirely distinct and independent concepts," '243 and affirmed the trial
court's finding that Fireman's had a right of contribution against
Maryland.2" The court's careful elucidation of the doctrines of
subrogation and contribution is cited below.
The court explained subrogation, as follows:
Subrogation is defined as the substitution of another person in place of the
creditor or claimant to whose rights he or she succeeds in relation to the debt or
claim. By undertaking to indemnify or pay the principal debtor's obligation to
233. Id.
234. For purposes of this Comment, we will assume that the payers and non-payers
insure exactly the same risks. Accordingly, the payer's action is one for equitable
contribution.
235. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 308
n.7 (Ct. App. 1998); CAL. PRAc. GuiDE INS. Lrr., supra note 228, ch. 9, § B, at 9:15.
236. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Ct. App. 1998).
237. See id. at 299-300.





243. Id. at 299.
244. See id. at 309.
the creditor or claimant, the "subrogee" is equitably subrogated to the claimant
(or "subrogor"), and succeeds to the subrogor's rights against the obligor. In
the case of insurance, subrogation takes the form of an insurer's right to be put
in the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties
legally responsible to the insured for a loss which the insurer has both insured
and paid....
;he right of subrogation is purely derivaye .... The subrogated insurer is
said to "stand in the shoes" of its insured ....
The court then discussed contribution.
Equitable contribution is entirely different. It is the right to recover, not
from the party primarily liable for the loss, but from a co-obligor who shares
such liability with the party seeking contribution. In the insurance context, the
right to contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to indemnify or
defend the same loss or claim, and one insurer has paid more than its share of
the loss or defended the action without any participation by the others. Where
multiple insurance carriers insure the same insured and cover the same risk,
each insurer has independent standing to assert a cause of action against its
coinsurers for equitable contribution when it has undertaken the defense or
indemnification of the common insured. Equitable contribution permits
reimbursement to the insurer that paid on the loss for the excess it paid over its
proportionate share of the obligation, on the theory that the debt it paid was
equally and concurrently owed by the other insurers and should be shared by
them pro rata in proportion to their respective coverage of the risk. The purpose
of this rule of equity is to accomplish substantial justice by equalizing the
common burden shared k coinsurers, and to prevent one insurer from profiting
at the expense of others.
The court made several further observations: (1) Because equitable
contribution presumes multiple insurers providing equal coverage, there
is generally no contribution right as between a primary insurer and an
excess insurer. 7 (2) An insurer asserting a contribution action does not
"stand in the shoes of the insured"--that is, it does not derive its claim
from any existing claim of the insured. 8 (3) An insured who obtains
coverage from multiple insurers does not thereby gain a right to
compensation in excess of damages actually suffered.49 Thus, if one
such insurer fully compensates the insured for a loss, the insured has no
claim (other than a possible bad-faith claim) against other non-paying
insurers for the same loss. 0° By the same token, these non-paying
insurers have no liability to the insured who has been fully compensated,
but may be held liable in a contribution suit brought by the paying
245. Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted).
246, Id. at 303-04 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
247. See id. at 304 n.4. Issues peculiar to actions between primary and secondary
insurers fall outside the scope of this Comment.
248. See id. at 304.
249. See id. at 305.
250. See id.
832
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insurer."' (4) Subrogation, and not contribution, is the appropriate cause
of action by a paying insurer against a non-paying insurer when the two
policies cover different risks. 2 (5) Finally, the public policy served by
the doctrine of contribution differs from that served by subrogation. 23
The court explains,
The aim of equitable subrogation is to place the burden for a loss on the party
ultimately liable or responsible for it and by whom it should have been
discharged, and to relieve entirely the insurer or surety who indemnified the loss
and who in equity was not primarily liable therefor. On the other hand, the aim
of equitable contribution is to apportion a loss between two or more insurers
who cover the same risk, so42at each pays its fair share and one does not profit
at the expense of the others.
Two final notes on contribution: First, when a court determines that
contribution is appropriate, it must then specify an appropriate
allocation 5-- often a pro rata formulation reflecting the respective
coverage limits of the relevant policies.76 Second, equitable
contribution did not exist under the common law.
57
251. See id.
252. See id. at 307. Accordingly, subrogation law is not applicable to the issues
herein. The discussion of subrogation has been included merely to clarify the law
concerning contribution.
253. See id. at 305-06.
254. Id. (citations omitted). In reviewing this Comment, Professor Wonnell at the
University of San Diego Law School offered an alternative rationale for the law of
contribution, which rationale he found not compelling. The idea is that contribution law
provides a default rule to which insurance companies would agree a priori in order to
reduce risk. This theory suffers from two deficiencies. First, as Wonnell pointed out,
insurers are generally considered to be risk neutral entities, and therefore would lack any
incentive (absent a diversification problem) to reduce risk. Second, this theory seems to
complicate matters unduly. Contribution law need not involve any implied agreement to
minimize risk. Rather, contribution law simply constitutes a particular application of the
familiar equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. Essentially, the payer is saying to the
non-payer, "I paid both my debt and your debt; you therefore owe me for your share of
the obligation so discharged."
255. See, e.g., CNA Cas. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 288 (Ct. App.
1986).
256. Consideration of alternative allocation methods falls beyond the scope of this
Comment.
257. See 5 WrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 9TH Torts, § 82, at 157 (9th ed.
1988). The contemporary law of contribution in California reflects judicial
interpretations of statutes. For a list of applicable statutes, see the CALIFORNIA PRAC.
GUIDE INS. LIT., supra note 228, ch. 9, § B, at 9:13.
F. The Insurer's Predicament
When an insured tenders defense of a third-party suit to its insurer and
the insurer believes that there is no duty to defend based on a lack of
coverage, the insurer faces a delicate situation. As one commentator has
written,
In these cases, the stakes are high .... An erroneous decision on either side of
this issue can result in large and unwarranted expense for an insurer, either in
the form of damages paid in an action premised upon a wrongful refusal to
defend, or in the payment of attomeqys' fees in a case for which there was no
potential indemnity under the policy.
Justice Arabian of the California Supreme Court has recognized that
the issue of the duty to defend can dwarf the issue of indemnification.
It is beyond serious dispute that once the duty to defend attaches, the insurer
often finds it necessary to fund all or part of a settlement regardless of its
underlying duty to indemnify, because the costs of defense may far exceed the
settlement . 9 ffer. The duty to defend becomes, in effect, the duty to
indemnify.
As a legal text states, "Manifestly ... the decision whether to defend...
is frequently difficult for the insurer." The insurer faces a
predicament.
A liability insurer can respond to this predicament in various ways.261
First, it can defend without any reservation of rights. 62 Second, it can
defend under a reservation of rights.23 Third, possibly in connection
with a reservation of rights, it can seek a judicial determination that no
defense is owed.' Fourth, it can simply deny coverage, based only on
its own determination of non-coverage. 265 These alternatives are further
discussed below.
Even though an insurer suspects that there is no duty to defend, it
might nonetheless elect to defend without any reservation of rights. The
reason is two-fold. First, such a course virtually eliminates any bad-faith
exposure. Second, absent a reservation of rights and assuming no
258. King & Benas, supra note 71, at 269.
259. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 804 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian,
J., dissenting).
260. 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 564, at 362 (1996).
261. I have slightly modified the assessment of one commentator who writes that
"[tihe insurer may: 1) defend without any reservation of rights; 2) defend under a
reservation of rights; or 3) disclaim coverage." Sue C. Jacobs, The Duty to Defend, 557
PLI LMo. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIEs 7, 11-12 (1997).
262. See id. at 11-12.
263. See id.
264. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal.
1993).
265. See Jacobs, supra note 261, at 11-12.
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impermissible conflict of interest, the insurer avoids the Cumis rule and
thereby retains full management control over the litigation and/or
settlement process. This control can be a powerful incentive for the
insurer,2 but it comes at a price. When the insurer defends without any
reservation of rights, waiver and/or estoppel doctrines may preclude
reimbursement of the insurer by the insured for non-covered
disbursements. 267
The second alternative overcomes the waiver and estoppel concerns.
A legal text explains,
[W]here the insurer is doubtful about its liability and wishes to retain all its
rights and at the same time protect itself against the claim that it has
unjustifiably refused to defend a suit against the insured, it may defend the case
under a so-called nonwaiver agreement, or reservation of rights, h which it
reserves all its rights to assert later the policy breach or noncoverage.
A reservation of rights, however, has its drawbacks. First, in order to be
effective, a reservation of rights must be timely,2 and it must
specifically enumerate the grounds for non-liability.70 Accordingly, an
insurer may be estopped from asserting certain defenses not included in
the reservation of rights.27 ' Second, as alluded to above, the potential
requirement of providing Cumis counsel constitutes a significant
disadvantage to defending under a reservation of rights.2 2 Third, an
insurer gains no benefit from the reservation of rights unless and until it
demonstrates non-coverage.273 Notwithstanding these drawbacks the
insurer can sometimes derive a huge benefit by defending under a
reservation of rights.274
266. See Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer's Duty to Defend, 2 CONN. INS. L.J.
221,261 (1997).
267. An insurer that defends without any reservation of rights is deemed to have
waived its right to contest coverage. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 529, 533 (Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, insurers have been estopped to assert
defenses not specifically mentioned in a reservation of rights. See Jacobs, supra note
261, at 50.
268. 39 CAL. JuR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 564, at 362 (1996).
269. See Jacobs, supra note 261, at 38.
270. See id. at 37.
271. See id. at53.
272. See Randall, supra note 266, at 261.
273. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744,
750 (Cal. 1975).
274. Consider the recent case of Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
Buss, the prominent owner of professional sports teams and a major sports arena,
unilaterally terminated a contract with an entity called H&H Sports. See id. at 769.
H&H sued Buss, alleging 27 counts. See id. Buss tendered defense of the suit to its
Whether the insurer defends under a reservation of rights or denies
coverage, the third alternative-seeking a judicial determination-may
be prudentY.2 5  Accordingly, the California Supreme Court stated, "In
order to avoid any possibility that a refusal to defend may subject it to
eventual liability for bad faith, the insurer is well advised to seek a
judicial determination that it owes no defense. This it may [secure
within] a declaratory relief action."276 This approach, however, has its
own drawbacks. First, pursuing declaratory relief means more litigation
expense-in particular because summary judgment will not be granted
in a declaratory relief action whenever the policy language is ambiguous
or the facts relevant to coverage are disputed 7 Second, the seeking of
declaratory relief may itself be offered as evidence of bad faith when
there is no reasonable basis for disputing coverage.278  Finally, any
declaratory relief action will normally be stayed when it involves issues
to be addressed in the underlying third-party suit.279 The California
Supreme Court explained, "To eliminate the risk of inconsistent factual
determinations that could prejudice the insured, a stay of the declaratory
relief action pending resolution of the third party suit is appropriate
when the coverage question turns on facts to be litigated in the
underlying action. 280
insurer, Transamerica. See id. Because only one claim-that for defamation-of the 27
counts alleged showed any potential for coverage, Transamerica agreed to defend under
a reservation of rights, also agreeing to afford Cumis counsel. See id. at 770. By the
time the suit settled, Transamerica had paid over $1,000,000 in defense costs, with only
some small portion (apparently in the range of $20,000 to $60,000) pertaining to the
covered defamation claim. See id. Transamerica subsequently brought suit seeking a
declaration that it had a right of reimbursement for defense costs not allocable to the
covered defamation claim. See id. at 771. The trial court denied a motion by Buss for
summary judgment, and this ruling was affirmed by the appellate court. See id. The
California Supreme Court granted review and held that Transamerica could claim
reimbursement for defense costs by demonstrating by a preponderance of the facts that
such costs "can be allocated solely to the claims that are not even potentially covered."
Id. at 778. Finding sufficient facts to suggest that Transamerica might meet this burden,
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rulings denying summary judgment for
Buss, thereby affording potential reimbursement of approximately $950,000. See id. at
784.
275. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal.
1993).
276. Id.
277. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp.
597, 604 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that an "employee exception" clause was ambiguous
and therefore holding that summary judgment was not appropriate).
278. See Dalrymple v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 854 (Ct.
App. 1995) ("It is at least arguable that pursuing a declaratory relief action regarding
coverage could be done for reasons indicating bad faith may be present: e.g., if there
were no proper cause to dispute coverage, and if more than an erroneous interpretation
of a policy.., were concerned.").
279. See Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1162.
280. Id. The court further explained,
836
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As a final alternative, the insurer can deny coverage based solely on
its own assessment of non-coverage.' While such a course can be very
risky, a recent California case confirms that it is not inherently
wrongful. 2 The court explained,
[A]ppellants contend that [the insurer] owed [the insured] a duty to defend
because it failed to obtain a declaratory judgment concerning its duty to defend
when the defense was tendered. This is incorrect. When, as here, there is no
potential for coverage on the basis of the facts known to the insurer at the time
of tender and the insurer "has made an informed decision on the basis of the
third party complaint and the extrinsic facts known to it at the time of tender
that thereSJs no potential for coverage, the insurer may refuse to defend the
lawsuit."
II. IssuEs AND ARGUMENTS
Moving now to the post-Alliance contribution action at issue herein,
the non-payer has faced the predicament described and has responded by
electing our fourth alternative-it denied coverage, relying solely on its
own assessment of non-coverage due to collusive fraud.' This being
so, we are now ready to consider whether (and under what
circumstances) such non-payer can be held liable for contribution to the
payer.25 A simple and accurate answer might be that the non-payer
For example, when the third party seeks damages on account of the insured's
negligence, and the insurer seeks to avoid providing a defense by arguing that
its insured harmed the third party by intentional conduct, the potential that the
insurer's proof will prejudice its insured in the underlying litigation is obvious.
This is the classic situation in which the declaratory relief action should be
stayed. By contrast, when the coverage question is logically unrelated to the
issues of consequence in the underlying case, the declaratory relief action may
properly proceed to judgment. An illustration of this latter sort of case is
found in Flynt. There, the question whether the owner had granted permission
for the driver's use of the car was irrelevant to the third party's personal injury
claim, and could properly be determined in the declaratory relief action
independently of the timing of the third party suit.
Id. (citation omitted).
281. See Zelda, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 365 (Ct. App.
1997).
282. See id.
283. Id. (quoting Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 277 (Ct. App.
1995)).
284. Recall that, by definition, collusive fraud involves wrongful (indeed criminal)
conduct by the insured. The alleged involvement of a guilty insured is a critical and
limiting assumption of this Comment.
285. Recall that, by assumption, the payer and the non-payer have equivalent
policies that insure exactly the same risks.
should be made to contribute if the insurers (payer and non-payer)
shared a duty to defend in the first place. But notice that this answer
may not be very helpful. Conceptually, the trier of fact in the
contribution action must evaluate the likely verdict of a hypothetical
trier of fact. That is, if the payer, instead of assuming the insured's
defense in the underlying suit, had instead denied coverage on the
grounds of collusive fraud-how would this hypothetical trier of fact
rule? If the hypothetical trier of fact would have found collusive fraud,
there would be no duty to defend, nor any duty of the non-payer to
contribute later. If, on the other hand, the hypothetical trier of fact
would not have found collusive fraud, the payer would have had a duty
to defend, and the non-payer would later be liable for contribution.
However, precisely because the collusive fraud issue was not litigated
prior to the non-payer's decision to deny coverage, the issue becomes
thorny. Can we merely assume that, because one insurer stepped up and
assumed the defense, the non-payer must have had a duty to defend? If
not, who has the burden of proof in the contribution action? And, what
is the burden of proof?
The following analysis begins with a highly theoretical question and
then proceeds to more practical questions. The theoretical question asks,
"Does or should an insurer have a duty to defend when he 'knows' that
the insured is involved in a collusive fraud?" Then, a more practical
question asks, "When there is 'substantial' evidence of collusive fraud,
does or should an insurer have the discretion to refuse to defend?" Next,
this Comment considers whether the payer might be said to owe certain
"gatekeeper" duties to the non-payer. Finally, this Comment considers
the ultimate burden-of-proof issues-i.e., in the contribution action, who
must prove what?
A. Does or Should an Insurer Have a Duty to Defend when It "Knows"
that the Insured Is Involved in Collusive Fraud?
1. Payer Arguments
a. Precedent Establishes that There Is a Duty to Defend when
the Complaint on Its Face Indicates There Could
Be Coverage-Even Where the Insurer Knows
the Claim Is Not Covered
This argument states what has been called the "complaint rule.' '26 A
286. Randall, supra note 266, at 222.
[VOL. 36: 797, 1999] Contribution Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
commentator explains,
In virtually every jurisdiction, the allegations of the complaint against a liability
insured determine an insurer's defense obligation. The virtues of the rule are
simplicity and protection of insureds' interests in receiving a defense: the
complaint provides an easy way to assess an insurer's obligation, particularly
where coverage is questionable and may depend on the resolution of the
litigation against an nsured. If the complaint alleges a covered claim, the
insurer must defend.
The complaint rule finds support in many jurisdictions. Accordingly,
New York's highest court noted approvingly in a 1991 case that "the
courts of this State have refused to permit insurers to look beyond the
complaint's allegations to avoid their obligation to defend."' 8 Similarly,
a federal court applying Pennsylvania law in 1995 cited the complaint
rule, noting that "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, an insurance company is
obligated to defend an insured whenever the complaint filed by the
injured party may potentially come within the policy's coverage. The
obligation to defend is determined solely by the allegations of the
complaint in the action. ' "
The California courts, until very recently, also espoused the complaint
rule. Thus, an appellate court wrote in 1986,
Indeed, the duty to defend is so broad that as long as the complaint contains
language creating the potential of liability under an insurance policy, the insurer
must defend an action against its insured even though it has independent
knowled of facts not in the pleadings that establish that the claim is not
covered.
However, the complaint rule was dealt a fatal blow in the California
Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Montrose Chemical Co. v. Superior
Court.2 ' After noting a conflict of opinions among the appellate courts
on the subject, the court held that, "where extrinsic evidence establishes
that the ultimate question of coverage can be determined as a matter of
law on undisputed facts, we see no reason to prevent an insurer from
seeking summary adjudication that no potential for liability exists and
thus that it has no duty to defend." 2  Two years later, the California
Supreme Court confirmed this rule, saying that, "where the extrinsic
287. Id.
288. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. 1991).
289. Kiewit E. Co. v. L&R Constr. Co., 44 F.3d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1995).
290. CNA Cas. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276,279 (Ct. App. 1986).
291. 861 P.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Cal. 1993).
292. Id. at 1159.
facts eliminate the potential for coverage, the insurer may decline to
defend even when the bare allegations in the complaint suggest potential
liability." '293 For better or for worse, the complaint rule has been rejected
in California.
b. Fraud Is Not a Recognized Exception to the Duty to Defend
In one sense, this argument is beyond dispute. The California
Supreme Court, as recently as 1995, has written that the duty to defend
"applies even to claims that are 'groundless, false, or fraudulent."' 294 On
the other hand, the argument clearly claims too much. First, there can be
no coverage of any fraudulent claim if the same claim, made truthfully,
would not be covered29 5 Such non-coverage can be established by the
insurance contract itself-either in the main text of the insuring
agreement or in the exclusions. 29' For example, a Louisiana court in
1992 held that an insurer had no duty to defend an insured being sued for
sexual molestation because an exclusion stated that the insurer "shall
have no duty to defend any claim... involving sexual molestation...
regardless of the circumstances... even though the allegations may be
groundless, false, orfraudulent."297
293. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 628 (Cal. 1995).
294. Id. at 627 (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 173 (Cal. 1966)).
The reason for this rule is obvious. Guarding against the exposure of an innocent person
to the risk of groundless, false, or fraudulent third-party claims constitutes a major
purpose of virtually all liability insurance.
295. See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 801 n.1 (Cal. 1993)
(Baxter, J., concurring) ("[T]he duty to defend groundless claims only applies when the
claims, if not groundless, might be covered."); JERRY, supra note 51, § 111, at 730 ("[A]
general rule might be stated as follows: The insurer has a duty to defend any lawsuit
alleging claims against its insured for which, if liability were later established, the
insurer would be required to pay damages on behalf of the insured.").
296. See Waler, 900 P.2d at 625.
297. Duplantis v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 606 So. 2d 51, 52-53 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (emphasis added).
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Second, the non-payer would point out the crucial difference between
a fraud on the insured and a fraud on the insurer.298 The latter, herein
termed "collusive fraud," is not a covered risk. Consider, for example,
the 1997 California case of Andrade v. Jennings.29 Andrade, while
working for his employer, Jorge, aboard a commercial fishing boat,
suffered a slip-and-fall accident allegedly caused by Jorge's
negligence 3 ° Jennings provided excess liability insurance to cover
losses exceeding the primary policy limit of one million dollars."1
Because the primary insurer had become insolvent,3 2 Jorge (and the boat
lienholder) colluded with Andrade, attempting to shift the loss onto
Jennings.3 Accordingly, Jorge and Andrade executed a settlement
agreement for roughly $1,500,0004 (on an injury actually worth no
more than $250,000'), Andrade agreed not to execute against Jorge's
298. Figure C, infra page 842, shows the types of insurance fraud possible in the
third-party setting and demonstrates the critical distinction between fraud on the insurer
and fraud on the insured. This Comment addresses only collusive fraud, defined to
include only fraud involving collusion by the insured. See supra note 4. Consider for
the moment, however, the half of the diagram labeled "Fraud on the Insured." Three
types of cases can be distinguished. (1) The first involves the simple (and undoubtedly
common) fraud on the insured perpetrated by the third-party plaintiff. An example
would be a claim for injuries not actually suffered. Because protection from such claims
is a primary purpose of insurance, insurers defend such claims routinely. (2) The second
involves a fraud perpetrated by the insured's counsel without the knowledge of the
insured. An example is intentional overbilling. If counsel is not Cumis counsel, the
solution to the problem is relatively straightforward-the insurer must attempt to hire
honest counsel for its insured, and then must supervise and monitor effectively. The
more difficult scenario involves an innocent insured represented by fraudulent Cumis
counsel. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the problem, difficult as it may be, belongs
to the insurer and cannot be passed on to the innocent insured. There is simply no basis
for absolving the insurer of its contractual duty to defend its innocent and good-faith
insured. The insurer must defend its insured and, at the same time, somehow find a way
to minimize such exposure. Just how to do this is an interesting question, but one which
lies beyond the scope of this Comment. (3) The third type of fraud on the insured
involves both the third-party plaintiff and the insured's counsel. The sum of comments
concerning the first two types of fraud on the insured would apply equally to this third
type.
299. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997).
300. See id. at 790.
301. See id. at789.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 797-98. Note that such collusion by the insured (Jorge) and the
third-party plaintiff (Andrade) constitutes a fraud on the insurer, rather than a fraud on
the insured.
304. See id. at 793-94.
305. See id. at 795.
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estate,3" and Jorge assigned his rights against Jennings to Andrade.37
Meanwhile, because attorneys involved deliberately kept Jennings
uninformed or misinformed, Jennings did not attend the prove-up
hearing in federal court.3 3 After approval of the stipulated judgment,
when Andrade sued Jennings in a California court to collect the
judgment, Jennings defended on the basis that the judgment was the
product of collusion.3 The trial court awarded summary judgment to
Andrade, but the appellate court reversed.' Ultimately, a jury delivered
a verdict in favor of Jennings,3 ' which verdict was upheld on appeal. 2
The appellate court explained,
Jennings may raise the defense of collusion against Andrade because "'[a]s
against the injured person an insurer may assert a defense based on breach by
the insured of the cooperation clause of the policy.' Collusive assistance in the
procurement of a judgment not only constitutes a breach of the cooperation
clause but also is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
As the insured, Jorge owed its excess insurer Jennings the duty of good
faith and fair deaWii. An insured may not manipulate claims to an excess
carrier's detriment.
While Andrade concerned indemnity only, by analogy such a
manipulation of claims cannot create a duty to defend.
c. Notwithstanding the Known Existence of Collusive Fraud, the Law
Should Require the Liability Insurer to Provide a Defense of the
Insured-This in Order to Avoid Creating the Potentialfor
Abuse by Other Insurers
In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 4 the insurer (who was found to have
wrongfully denied its duty to defend) argued that it should be liable only
for the cost of the defense and not for payment of the damage award." 5
While the facts of the case suggest that the insurer might not have had a
contractual duty to indemnify the insured, the California Supreme Court
nonetheless rejected the insurer's argument, reasoning in part that the
306. See id. at 789.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 791-94.
309. See id. at 794.
310. See id.
311. See id. at795.
312. See id. at 802.
313. Id. at 798 (citations omitted).
314. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
315. See id. at 178-79.
rule proposed would "encourage insurance companies to similar
disavowals of responsibility with everything to gain and nothing to
lose."3 6 The above payer's argument suggests a similar fear. The fear,
common in the law, is that, once insurers realize that they might avoid
defending an insured by pleading collusive fraud, insurers will make
such pleadings without justification and will sometimes prevail. Or,
worse still, irresponsible insurers might collude with their own insureds
to deny coverage to a third-party victim."7
In rebuttal, the non-payer can point out that severe penalties are
inflicted on an insurer found to act in bad faith. Allowing an insurer to
decline defense coverage when it has knowledge of collusive fraud does
not in any way lessen the enormous and effective incentives prevailing
today for an insurer to act in good faith. Moreover, are we really
comfortable denying justice to an insurer victimized by a criminal
conspiracy? Admittedly, a bright-line rule achieves some judicial
economy. Admittedly, also, the sophisticated and devastating collusive
fraud perpetrated by the Alliance may not be very common. But
denying the courts an ability to administer justice on a case-by-case
basis seems to offend the basic values of the American system of justice.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has resisted compromise of a
similar nature, writing,
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish the
frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach
some erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process,
offers no reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of [cases] an
artificial and indefensible barrier. Courts not only compromise their basic
responsibility to decide the merits of each case individually but destroy the
public's confidence in them by using the broad broom of "administrative
convenience' to sweep away a class of claims a number of which are admittedly
meritonous.
2. Non-Payer Arguments
a. Collusive Fraud Is a Breach of the Cooperation Clause Which
Eliminates Any Duty to Defend
The requirement of cooperation by the insured has been termed a
"condition precedent" to an insurer's duty of indemnification. 9 The
insured's duty to cooperate with its liability insurer has been
316. Id. at 179.
317. This concern was expressed by the dissent in Valladao v. Fireman's Fund
Indemnity Co., 89 P.2d 643, 651 (Cal. 1939) (Houser, J., dissenting).
318. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 918 (Cal. 1968).
319. Valladao, 89 P.2d at 650 (quoting Finkle v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 26 S.W.2d
843, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930)).
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characterized as "the flipside of the insurer's duty to defend.""32 Surely
an insured who commits a collusive fraud, either by collusion with the
third-party plaintiff or the insured's fraudulent attorney, violates this
requirement. 321' As explained in a legal text, such a violation relieves the
insurer of any duty to defend.
An insurer is not bound to continue to defend an action against an insured
who substantially breaches the conditions of the policy with respect to such
matters as prompt notice of an accident or suit and cooperation in the defense,
resulting in prejudice to the insurer. If the insurer shows such a breach, it may
deny coveragej1uring the pendency of the underlying action and cease to defend
the action ....
Concealment or misrepresentation violates the non-cooperation clause
and therefore eliminates any duty to defend. 3
b. Collusive Fraud Constitutes a Material Misrepresentation Which
Eliminates Any Duty to Defend
Insurance policies generally contain language similar to the following:
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has
willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein,32r in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating
thereto.
The voiding of a policy on the basis of misrepresentation derives from
contract law." Note that even an incomplete disclosure, if material, can
void the policy." Moreover, courts have held that this provision will be
320. JERRY, supra note 51, § 110, at 719.
321. Robert H. Jerry explains, "Indeed, a principle purpose of the cooperation
clause is the prevention of collusion between the insured and the injured third party." Id.
at 720. "Collusion... is perhaps the worst kind of noncooperation." Id. at 728.
322. 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 561, at 355 (1996).
323. See id. § 565, at 366.
324. Little, supra note 225, at 66 n.72.
325. Robert H. Jerry explains,
The misrepresentation defense in insurance law is simply a variant of the more
general contract law principle that allows an injured party to void a contract
when that party's assent to the bargain is induced by the fraudulent or material
misrepresentation of the other contracting party, and the injured party relies on
the misrepresentation in question.
JERRY, supra note 51, § 102(a), at 682 (citation omitted).
326. See Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime, and All Risk
Coverage: The Availability of Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 TORT & INS. L.J.
assumed even in the absence of explicit language.327 As a California
court recently stated, a finding that "the underlying action is a sham...
obviate[s] the necessity of further defense.""
c. Collusive Fraud Is a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing and Eliminates Any Duty to Defend
A California appellate court recognized that collusion by the insured
against the interest of the insurer "not only constitutes a breach of the
cooperation clause but also is a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." '329 Collusive fraud therefore constitutes a defense to
coverage.3
d. In the Context of Collusive Fraud, There Is No "Accident," and the
Insurer Therefore Has No Duty to Defend
Liability insurance policies are meant to protect the insured against the
unforeseen-with a typical policy limiting coverage to injuries caused
by "an accident... which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."33' An
example of such a limitation of coverage can be seen in the 1986 case of
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Whitaker.12 In this case, Knighten, the
insured, was a homebuilder who contracted to build and sell a home to
Whitaker with the close of escrow to be no later than a specified date.33
When escrow closed late, Whitaker sued Knighten for breach of contract
and for fraud, alleging that Knighten had never in fact intended to
deliver by the specified date 4 - After Knighten's insurer, Royal Globe,
refused to defend, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment for
Whitaker."' In return for a covenant not to execute, Knighten then
assigned his rights against Royal Globe to Whitaker.33 When Royal
Globe sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or
905, 910 (1997) (citing Methodist Med. Ctr. v. American Med. Sec., 38 F.3d 316, 319-
20 (7th Cir. 1994); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindenman, 911 F. Supp. 619, 624-25
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lane, 227 A.2d 231 (Md. 1967)).
327. See id. at 924 (citing as example Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 334 F. Supp. 255, 258
(E.D. Pa. 1971)).
328. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792,799 (Cal. 1993).
329. Span, Inc. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr. 828, 839 (Ct. App. 1991).
330. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787,798 (Ct. App. 1997).
331. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435, 435 (Ct. App. 1986)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
332. 226 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1986).
333. See id. at 435.
334. See id. at 435-36.
335. See id. at 436.
336. See id.
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indemnify, Whitaker filed a cross complaint against Royal Globe.337 The
trial court ruled for Royal Globe, finding that the insured could have no
reasonable expectation of coverage based on language in the policy
limiting coverage to accidents.338 The appellate court affirmed, noting
that "[a]n intentional act is not an 'accident' within the plain meaning of
the word." '339 In essence, because fraud is always an intentional act, such
alleged conduct lies outside the limits of "accident" coverage and thus
there was no duty to defend. The non-payer would therefore argue: If
the insured's conduct is actually fraudulent (as against the insurer) rather
than merely allegedly fraudulent (as against the third-party), the
insured's claim must be even weaker than the claim of Knighten in
Whitaker, and therefore must be rejected.
e. Collusive Fraud on the Insurer Constitutes a Willful Act of the
Insured Which, by Statute, Precludes Insurance Coverage
A federal district court in California explained,
Regardless of the express language of a policy, California Insurance Code §
533 establishes an implied exclusionary clause which must be read into every
insurance agreement. Section 533 provides that "In insurer is not liable for a
loss caused by the willful act of the insured ... [."
Consider the application of this statute in the 1993 case of Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft. 4' In that case, Sheft sued the estate of
his former lover Rock Hudson (the movie star) for damages caused
because Hudson had AIDS and misrepresented and concealed this fact
while continuing in a sexual relationship with Sheft.TM2 When Hudson's
estate tendered defense to Aetna (Hudson's insurer), Aetna disclaimed
coverage based on both the policy exclusion for intentional acts and
section 53 3 .M3 The trial court ruled for Aetna, finding coverage
precluded on both grounds.' The appellate court affirmed, but qualified
its opinion in a footnote, saying,
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 437-38 (citation omitted).
340. Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597,
605 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
341. 989 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993).
342. See id. at 1106.
343. See id.
344. See id.
[B]ecause the parties do not distinguish between an insurer's duty to defend and
its duty to indemnify, we do not consider the possibility that the district court
may have erred in holding that Aetna had no duty to defend evenvhile the
court correctly concluded that the insurer owed no duty to indemnify.
In fact, California courts have split on the issue avoided by the
appellate court in Aetna.46 Some courts assert that "a contract to defend
an assured upon mere accusations of a wil[1]ful tort does not encourage
such wil[l]ful conduct" and therefore is not void under section 5 3 3 -47
Other courts have found no duty to defend in the context of alleged
willful conduct.148 A commentator notes,
The cases of Republic Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court and Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Hubbard are frequently cited for the proposition that Insurance
Code § 533 will only preclude an indemnity obligation and have no effect on
the duty to defend analysis. TI [case of B & E Convalescent Center v. State
Compensation Insurance Fund" ] is significant in that it arises out of the same
district as both Republic Indemnity and Ohio Casualty. The B & E
Convalescent Center case has made it clear that a defense is required, where
coverage is otherwise precluded by Insurance Code § 533, only where the
insurance policy language itself creates a reasonable expectation that the policy
will afford a defense. Where the policy itself does not create any such
expectation, Iurance Code § 533 may appropriately preclude defense as well
as indemnity.
Based upon the reasoning of B & E Convalescent Center v. State
Compensation Insurance Fund,35' an insurer owes no duty to defend to
an insured perpetrating collusive fraud. Section 533 precludes such
coverage and the insured certainly cannot be heard to say that the policy
creates an expectation of coverage for such a claim.
345. Id. at 1109 n.3 (citation omitted).
346. See 39 CAL. JuR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 557, at 344-47 (1996).
347. CNA Cas. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 285 n.8 (Ct. App. 1986)
(citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966)).
348. See, e.g., B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr.
2d 894 (Ct. App. 1992).
349. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1992)..
350. King & Benas, supra note 71, at 261 (citations omitted).
351. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1992).
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B. Assuming There Is "Substantial" But Inconclusive Evidence of
Collusive Fraud, Does an Insurer Who Refuses to Defend
Thereby Commit a Breach of Duty?
1. Payer Arguments
a. When a Liability Insurer Suspects Collusive Fraud, It Must
Nonetheless Defend the Insured Until Such Suspicion
Becomes an Irrefutable Fact
The California courts have held that "[a]ny doubt as to whether the
facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured's favor."'352
In 1993, the California Supreme Court reinforced this rule, saying,
"Facts merely tending to show that the claim is not covered, or may not
be covered, but are insufficient to eliminate the possibility... of
coverage.., add no weight to the scales." '353 Likewise, a 1996 California
appellate court wrote, "Once a prima facie showing is made that the
underlying action fell within coverage provisions, an insurer may defeat
a motion for summary judgment only by producing undisputed extrinsic
evidence conclusively eliminating the potential for coverage under the
policy."3 -M A 1995 Georgia case further illustrates, in the indemnity
context, that the insurer carries a heavy burden. In Georgia Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richardson,3 55 a fire insurer denied
coverage to the insured whose house burned down when it discovered
evidence suggesting arson.356 The appellate court upheld a jury verdict
for the insured, including damages for bad faith by the insurer, finding
that "there was absolutely no proof that [the insured] actually set the
fire. 357 In a similar vein, the payer would argue that a liability insurer
352. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1993) (citation
omitted).
353. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1993).
354. Maryland Cas. Co. v. National Am. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 504 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citation omitted).
355. 457 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
356. See id. at 186. The evidence showed that the fire had been accelerated by a
flammable liquid, the insured had been experiencing financial difficulties, the insured
had given some conflicting statements regarding her finances, a neighbor had not seen
the insured at her home in the days before the fire, and that the insured and her family
were not staying at the house on the night of the fire. See id.
357. Id.
must defend unless and until it can disprove any and all potential for
coverage.
The non-payer's rebuttal of this argument is discussed below in Part
III.B.2.a.
b. Because an Allegation of Collusive Fraud Can Only Be Conclusively
Resolved by Trial, the Insurer May Not Unilaterally Decide to
Withhold a Defense on a Claim Which, if Not Fraudulent,
Would Be Covered
Payer might assert that any alleged misbehavior by the insured, even if
true, does not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend. Payer would cite
language from Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.58 (discussed earlier in
connection with first-party bad faith): "[T]he insurer's duty is
unconditional and independent of the performance of [the insured's]
contractual obligations."3 9 Accordingly, payer would argue, the insurer
must either defend or obtain declaratory relief. Payer would also cite
CNA Casualty v. Seaboard Surety Co.,W which states that an issue
concerning material concealment "is a question of fact to be decided by
the trial court on the basis of the evidence." '' By analogy, the payer
would argue, any unproven allegation of collusion should be resolved
through the judicial process-not by the insurer in a unilateral manner.
The non-payer would attempt to rebut this argument by first noting
that the Gruenberg quote refers to the duty of good faith and fair
dealing-not the duty to defend' 6 Because not every refusal to defend
constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, this rule
does not help much. Second, the non-payer would assert that the law
does allow the insurer to make determinations of its own concerning
coverage, albeit at its own risk. Accordingly, the Comunale court wrote,
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its
position may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be
wrongful it is liable for the full amount which will compensate the insured for
all the detriment caused lg the insurer's breach of the express and implied
obligations of the contract.
Therefore, when there are some grounds for denial, the insurer has the
discretion to deny coverage, with penalties accruing if the denial is
found to be wrongful. The non-payer would argue that, by implication,
358. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
359. Id. at 1040.
360. 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1986).
361. Id. at 286.
362. See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1040.
363. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958).
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the denial is at least potentially not wrongful, and thus the payer's
argument fails. Finally, the non-payer would argue that there is a good
public-policy reason for allowing the insurer the unilateral discretion to
deny coverage. As the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote,
[T]he insured urges the carrier should be required to seek a declaration of its
duty before the trial of the injured party's suit against the insured. But that
proposition could lead to unnecessary litigation, for it would compel a lawsuit
whenever coverage is denied even though the insured may silently agree with
the carrier's position. We think the better curse is to leave it to the contenders
to decide for themselves if and when to sue.
2. Non-Payer Arguments
a. The Law Affords Insurers the Discretion to Deny Coverage in the
Face of Uncertainty when Done Within the Bounds of Reason
and Good Faith
The non-payer would point to the words of a 1995 California Supreme
Court decision concerning the duty to defend: "[Precedent] does not
hold, as plaintiffs suggest, that the insurer must always defend a third
party lawsuit... 'until the extent of 'the policy coverage' is legally
certain' .... This has never been the law."" Thus, the non-payer would
argue that, in the context of substantial evidence of collusive fraud, there
is no such rigid rule demanding the insurer to defend. A 1996 California
appellate court recognized that a purportedly absolute duty to defend
must yield to reason, writing that "the insurer has no duty to defend
where the potential for liability is 'tenuous and farfetched."' 36 Also,
because collusive fraud voids the policy entirely, a good-faith denial of
coverage for reasonable cause cannot be wrongful for the simple reason
that a "bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are
due.
,367
Precedent supports reasonable and good-faith denials of coverage, at
least in the context of indemnification. Compare the result in the
364. Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1970).
365. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 632 (Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
366. Michaelian v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 141 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing American Guar. & Liability v. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787,
794 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
367. Waller, 900 P.2d at 622.
Richardson case cited above with the 1995 case of Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Madan.368 In Madan, the court found that a fire insurer who
denied coverage based on evidence of arson was not guilty of bad faith,
notwithstanding inconclusive evidence.3 69 The court explained that "[a]
court can conclude as a matter of law that an insurer's denial of a claim
is not unreasonable, so long as there existed a genuine issue as to the
insurer's liability."37 The non-payer would argue that, by analogy, a
liability insurer need not defend when there is substantial evidence of
collusion by the insured.
b. When There Is Substantial Evidence of Collusion, the Interests of
Public Policy Are Best Served by Allowing the Insurer the
Discretion to Deny Coverage
In the actual post-Alliance contribution case, the non-payer argued
that the payer caved in to extortion-like pressures from the Alliance.
According to the non-payer, the payer defended because it feared a bad-
faith suit, rather than because it owed any duty under the policy.
37 1
Essentially, the payer "wimped out," having been intimidated by a bully,
the Alliance. Such conduct, the non-payer would assert, constitutes a
woeful abdication of responsibility-working to the considerable
detriment of society at large. According to the non-payer, every
insurance company can and should serve a screening function by
vigorously opposing collusive fraud.
Moreover, the non-payer would argue that allowing the insurer the
ability to perform such a screening function does not diminish the strong
incentives, currently in place, which encourage good faith performance
by insurers. As one commentator writes,
[A]n insurer has strong incentives to undertake the defense of an insured
where it appears that there is coverage, based on the facts. The insurer's
duty to defend is a right as well as a duty: the insurer's ability to participate
in and control a lawsuit protects the insurer's interests in containing defense
costs and minimizing its liability exposure. If there is coverage, or it
appears likely that3gere is coverage, the insurer will want to defend to
protect its interests.
368. 889 F. Supp. 374 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
369. See id. at 380.
370. Id.
371. See Interview with Robert K. Schraner, supra note 26.
372. Randall, supra note 266, at 261 (citation omitted). Robert H. Jerry concurs,
writing,
Although no known source of data allows these observations to be tested
empirically, it would seem that most insurers provide a defense whenever it
appears that coverage is possible; this is because insurers want to control the
defense and reduce their own (and their insured's) indemnity exposure if
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As discussed earlier, the prospect of punitive damages looms like a giant
hammer over the head of the insurer. Thus, if the insurer denies
coverage in bad faith-e.g., it denies on the basis of collusion without
having a reasonable and good-faith belief that such collusion exists-
enormous damages can be assessed.
The non-payer would also argue that stripping insurers of the ability to
independently resist collusive fraud will enhance the potential for
extortion. Consider in this regard the writing of California Supreme
Court Justice Baxter in 1993.
As the majority suggest[s], the insurer is free to use the litigation process to
winnow sham claims .... However, it is well to remember that from the
insurer's perspective, the duty to defend, with its attendant costs, imposes the
pressure to settle.
. However groundless [a claim] might ultimately prove, it can sup~l
invaluable leverage toward a compromised recovery from the insurer's funds.
Finally, the non-payer would point out that forcing the insurer to go to
court for declaratory relief adds more burden to a heavily strained legal
system.
C. In Connection with a Contribution Action, Are There Any
"Gatekeeper" Duties Owed by the Payer to the
Non-Payer Which Must Be Satisfied 74
1. Non-Payer Argument
a. Prior to Any Award of Contribution to the Payer, the Payer Must
Demonstrate that It Managed the Defense of the Insured in
Good Faith and in a Reasonable Manner
The universal interest of insurers in cost containment, particularly in
the face of increasing fraud, has led to highly structured efforts to
possible. By this same analysis, it would seem that insurers are likely to deny
a defense only when they, rightly or wrongly, are very certain that the claim is
outside coverage.
JERRY, supra note 51, § 111, at 743.
373. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 801 (Cal. 1993) (Baxter, J.,
concurring).
374. The notion that there might be such a duty was suggested to this author during
the Interview with Robert K. Schraner, supra note 26.
control "outside" legal costs. A commentator explains, "Most insurers
now require defense counsel to adhere to reporting and billing
requirements set forth in outside counsel guidelines. Under such
guidelines, insurers refuse to pay counsel for certain tasks undertaken or
expenses incurred in the defense of insureds. 375 The question arises
whether a payer should be similarly held to reasonable standards
regarding the management of an insured's defense. Assuming
contribution is appropriate, could the non-payer nonetheless assert a
cross-complaint against the payer for negligent mismanagement of the
case? For example, if the non-payer can show that a reasonable insurer
would have detected collusive fraud but the payer defended nonetheless,
could the non-payer, if compelled to contribute, subsequently sue the
payer to recover its portion of the expenditures? A 1986 annotation in
the American Law Reports (ALR) discussed a similar question-
"whether an excess insurer may maintain a direct action against a
primary insurer for that insurer's improper or inadequate defense of
claim.'376 The ALR author found one case on point, the 1984 New York
case of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Michigan Mutual
Insurance Co.377 In that case, the primary insurer (Michigan) and the
excess insurer (Hartford) both insured three related companies."' When
Michigan defended a negligence suit against two of the three insured
companies, Hartford demanded that Michigan implead the third insured
company."' Michigan refused, allegedly in order to shift exposure from
Michigan to Hartford.38 After the case settled for $1,400,000, and
Hartford paid $400,000 of the award, Hartford sued Michigan for, inter
alia, bad faith in failing to implead the third insured.38' The trial court
granted Michigan's motion for summary judgment, but the appellate
court reversed and New York's highest court granted review. The
high court recognized a direct cause of action against the primary
375. Douglas R. Richmond, The Business and Ethics of Liability Insurer's Efforts to
Manage Legal Care, 28 U. MEM. L. Rav. 57, 59 (1997).
376. Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Liability Insurance: Excess Carrier's Right of
Action Against Primary Carrier for Improper or Inadequate Defense of Claim, 49
A.L.R.4th 304, 305 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Note that the claim
under consideration in this ALR annotation is a direct claim. Accordingly, the claim is
distinct from a claim by an excess insurer against a primary insurer alleging a wrongful
refusal to settle within the primary coverage limit. In this latter type of case, the action is
not a direct claim; instead it is "based on the theory of equitable subrogation."
Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Cal. 1980).
377. 463 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1984).
378. See id. at 609.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 609-10.
381. Seeid. at610.
382. See id.
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insurer, writing,
Michigan Mutual as the primary liability insurer owed to Hartford as the excess
carrier the same duty to act in good faith which Michigan owed to its own
insureds .... Whether Michigan Mutual acted... in its own interest so as to
activate Hartford's excess liability without haav)ng to share in ... [that liability
is] a question to be determined upon trial ....
Arguing by analogy, the non-payer would assert that the payer has a
comparable duty to the non-payer. Arguably, this duty would continue
beyond the initial decision to defend, such that defending beyond the
point when a reasonable insurer would terminate the defense (e.g., based
on evidence of a collusive fraud) would constitute a breach of such duty.
The payer would attempt to rebut this argument in five ways. First,
the New York precedent is not binding on California courts. Second, the
cited case involves the interplay of primary and excess insurance-a
wholly different context from a contribution action. Third, the facts are
otherwise distinguishable: Michigan gained an unwarranted benefit
directly at the expense of Hartford. In the Alliance context, by contrast,
the payer's conduct was not self-serving and indeed hurt the payer as
much as it hurt anyone else. Fourth, the courts should proceed with
great caution and reluctance to find a duty where none has previously
been recognized. Indeed the courts have consistently emphasized the
propriety of such restraint in a series of modem cases concerning insider
trading. In Chiarella v. United States,3 for example, after an employee
at a printing press was convicted for trading on information he gleaned
from documents concerning a pending takeover attempt, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower courts had "failed
to identify a relationship between [the employee/stock buyer] and [his
stock trading partners] that could give rise to a duty."3 Later, in United
States v. Chestman,386 after a stock broker had been convicted under Rule
10(b)(5) for insider trading, a United States appellate court reversed that
conviction, stating that "a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally
by entrusting a person with confidential information." 3  By similar
reasoning, the payer would argue that there is no duty, contractual or
otherwise, owed by the payer to the non-payer, and the payer's decision
383. Id.
384. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
385. Id. at 232.
386. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
387. Id. at 567.
to defend cannot unilaterally create such a duty. Finally, the payer
would argue that recognizing such a duty serves no public policy
purpose because in a contribution action the plaintiff can claim only
reasonable expenses anyway.
388
D. Given that the Non-Payer Denied Coverage on the Basis of
Collusive Fraud, What Must Be Proven in a Subsequent
Contribution Action?
1. Payer Arguments
a. Where the Payer Lacked Conclusive Knowledge of a Collusive Fraud
at the Time the Defense Was Tendered, the Courts Should Enforce
a Bright-Line Rule Mandating Contribution by the Non-Payer in
Order to Achieve Judicial Economy, Avoid a Potential
Free-Rider Problem, and Spread Losses
The courts frequently employ convenient shortcuts for allocating
liability in an inexact but acceptable manner. An example is the "time
on the risk" method of apportionment used in the context of continuous
injury cases. A commentator explains, "In the settlement of continuous
injury cases, where the causation of injuries cannot be placed in definite
policy periods, the 'time on the risk' method seems to be the tool of
choice for apportioning responsibility ... .,,39 In discussing the
application of such an approach to a particular case, the commentator
wrote, "The analysis used by the court... is logical and realistic. The
court concluded that even though it would have been scientifically
possible to prove the amount of harm occurring during each policy
period, it was nonetheless far too expensive to warrant such proof in that
case."390  For the same reason, the payer would argue, trying to
adjudicate the duty to defend years after the fact would be very
expensive. For this reason, the more realistic approach would be to
simply mandate contribution.
The payer would also argue that a bright-line rule additionally serves
388. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (Ct.
App. 1971) (where "reasonableness of attorneys' fees and costs were resolved" by
stipulation).
389. Rob S. Register, Comment, Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of
Consecutive Insurers when the Actual Occurrence of Injury Cannot Be Ascertained:
Who Has to Contribute in a Settlement?, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1151, 1159 (1998).
390. Id. at 1160.
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to eliminate a potential free-rider problem. The concern is that, absent a
sure contribution requirement, insurer A might improperly deny its duty
to defend-in the hope that insurer B will provide the defense and will
either not pursue contribution or will somehow fail to prevail in a
contribution action. In other words, if there are legal arguments
available to get A off the hook, A might prefer to roll the dice and see
what happens. Clearly, such an incentive operates to the detriment of
the entire insurance system.
Lastly, the payer might assert that there is a public policy benefit from
spreading the loss among insurers through mandatory contribution. By
spreading losses, insurers would presumably avoid catastrophic losses,
this having a stabilizing and otherwise beneficial effect on the insurance
system generally.
The non-payer would counter with three arguments. First, bright-line
rules often frustrate the administration of justice. As a California
appellate court wrote in connection with community-property law,
We recognize that were we to adopt an inflexible rule, it might help litigating
spouses and their counsel settle... disputes and, at the same time, provide an
easy measure to be applied by trial courts. However, to do so would be to
follow the recent tendency of appellate courts and the Legislature, which we
decry, to adopt rules which on the surface are easy to aply and foster
consistency yet, as applied, too often achieve inequitable results.
Accordingly, a California appellate court in 1995 rejected fast-track
justice, writing, "A nonparty insurer must be given a fair opportunity to
litigate the question of whether [a] settlement was unreasonable or was
the product of fraud or collusion .... 392
Second, the non-payer would take a different view regarding
incentives. As discussed above, powerful incentives are currently in
place to discourage such free-riding, and these incentives remain intact
regardless of the rule applicable in a contribution action. Accordingly,
any insurer who wrongfully refuses coverage may be subject to costly
extra-contractual damages, including punitive damages. Moreover,
denying the non-payer any ability to contest coverage could itself create
undesirable incentives. For example, any one insurer would have less
incentive to fight collusive fraud, knowing that it can pass the buck if
and when it confronts the problem. Or, worse still, a fraudulent insurer
in conspiracy with a fraudulent insured might intentionally defend a
391. In re Marriage of Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676, 686 (Ct. App. 1984).
392. Pruyn v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 311 (Ct. App. 1995).
frivolous claim, with the purpose of forcing contribution from the
innocent insurer who is outside the conspiracy. Effectively, the dollars
so "spent" would be transferred figuratively from the left hand to the
right, augmented by considerable funds from the honest co-insurer. In
short, the proposed bright-line rule could be a cure worse than the
disease.
Finally, the non-payer would object to the idea that mandatory
contribution supports a worthy goal of loss spreading. Insurance
companies are perfectly capable of accomplishing risk management
through reinsurance without the help of a paternalistic judicial system.
Moreover, in the words of a California appellate court, "It is not the role
of the courts to legislate." '393 Absent an established basis in the law, the
courts should let the loss lie where it falls.
b. Because the Non-Payer Refused to Join the Payers in Managing the
Insured's Defense, the Non-Payer Is Estopped from Asserting
Fault in the Defense Afforded' 4
The payer would argue that the non-payer is estopped from denying
coverage (or otherwise criticizing the manner of defense afforded) by
virtue of its failure either to obtain declaratory relief up front or to
defend under a reservation of rights. This argument finds some support
in the 1995 decision of an Illinois appellate court, which wrote,
Under Illinois law, when a liability insurer questions whether the insured's
claim might possibly fall within the scope of the policy coverage, the insurer
must either (1) seek a declaratory judgment as to its rights and obligations
before or pending trial or (2) defend the insured under a reservation of rights.
When an insured tenders defense to an insurer, the insurer may not simply
refuse to participate in the litigation and wait for the insured to institute
litigation against the insurer to determine the insurer's respective rights and
duties. Further, when the insurer refuses to tender a defense to its insured or
fails to take either of the aforementioned actions, the insurer % barred from
disputing policy coverage in a subsequent lawsuit by the insured.
By similar logic, the payer would assert that the non-payer is estopped
from denying coverage and must make contribution.
The non-payer would object to the estoppel argument on the following
grounds: First, the Illinois precedent is not binding on California courts.
Second, the facts are distinguishable in that, in the Illinois case, the
insured-not a plaintiff in a contribution suit-brought the suit. This is
393. Estate of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 691 (Ct. App. 1986).
394. This argument was raised by the payer's attorney in the contribution suit
discussed supra note 6. See interview with Robert Schraner, supra note 26.
395. Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(citations omitted).
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important because of the distinction between a subrogation action
(where the insurer "stands in the shoes of the insured") and a
contribution action. If the payer were asserting a subrogation action, the
precedent might be applicable, but then the "unclean hands" doctrine
would open the fraud question anew.396 Third, in any case, collusive
fraud constitutes a recognized exception to the estoppel rule, as
recognized by the California Supreme Court which wrote in a 1959 case,
An insurer that has been notified of an action and refuses to defend on the
ground that the alleged claim is not within the policy coverage is bound by a
judgment in the action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material
findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the insured.39The insurer
is not bound, however, as to issues not necessarily adjudicated ....
Rejection of such an estoppel argument finds support in Andrade v.
Jennings, where the court specifically rejected an argument that the
excess insurer was estopped from collaterally challenging a consent
judgment by virtue of its absence at the prove-up hearing, holding that
the insurer must be given the opportunity to show collusion.'9' Finally,
the non-payer would point out that a finding of estoppel requires the
showing of detrimental reliance,3 which the payer presumably could not
show.
2. Non-Payer Argument
a. In a Contribution Action, the Payer Must Demonstrate Two Facts:
The Payer Has Paid More than Its Legal Obligation and the
Non-Payer Has Paid Less than Its Legal Obligation
In arguing against automatic contribution, the non-payer would cite
the 1990 California case of United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Hanover
396. The "unclean hands" doctrine requires that a plaintiff act "fairly and without
fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945). The doctrine of
"unclean hands" was offered as a defense by the "non-payer" in the contribution suit
discussed supra note 6. See Mediation Brief for U.S. Fire Ins. Co. at 5, New Hampshire
Ins. Co. v. National Ben Franklin, No. BC012590 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), affid,
No. B101206 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1998) (not published). As mentioned, such a
defense could be effective only if the payer were suing by subrogation.
397. Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881, 883
(Cal. 1959) (emphasis added).
398. See Andrade v. Jennings, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787,796-97 (CL App. 1997).
399. See Somerset S. Properties, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 873 F. Supp. 355,
359 (S.D. Cal. 1994); JERRY, supra note 51, § 25E, at 148.
Insurance Co.4 In that case, three insurers allegedly covering a
personal injury claim agreed to have an arbitrator apportion liabilities
but reserved the right to challenge such apportionment by the judicial
process.41 After each insurer made payment to the injured party in
significantly varying amounts in accordance with the arbitration result,
each proceeded with a declaratory relief action to challenge the
apportionment., °2  The trial court found, however, that none of the
insurers had actually been liable on the claim, and it declined to effect
any change.40'3  The appellate court affirmed, endorsing the trial court
view that "[a]bsent a fixed and positive obligation to pay under
compulsion, there is no right to contribution." 404 The appellate court
further explained,
Before equity will intervene, a party seeking relief must demonstrate that it has
paid more of an obligation than its share while others have paid less than their
share. The trial court's unchallenged findings that no insurer covered the loss
leaves no doubt that none of the three insurers can show that any of the others
paid less than their share of an "obligation" no one of the three owed.
i [T]he trial court kept the parties as it found them at the time of
judgment.... [N]one of the settling parties had any greater equity than the
other, since none covered the loss. As such, the court's ruling comports well
with the traditional equitable maxim, "Between those w are equally in the
right, or equally in the wrong, the law does not interpose."
By the same token, the non-payer would argue that it should not be
made to contribute absent a finding that, in denying coverage, the non-
payer paid less than its legal obligation.
400. 266 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1990).
401. See id. at 232-33.
402. See id. at 233.
403. See id. at 234.
404. Id.
405. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 231, 237, 239 (Ct.
App. 1990) (citations omitted).
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E. Assuming that Liability Must Be Proven in the Contemplated
Contribution Action, Which Party Should Have the
Burden of Proof?
1. Payer Argument
a. Both Reason and Public Policy Support a Presumption in Favor of
the Payer Such that the Non-Payer Should Bear the Burden of
Proof in a Contribution Action
The payer would argue that once it makes a prima facie case for
coverage, the burden shifts to the non-payer to prove it did not breach its
duty to defend. This argument finds some support in Amato v. Mercury
Casualty Co. , which cites precedent stating,
[I]f the plaintiff produces evidence of the basic or foundational facts, then the
burden of proof will shift to the defendant insurers to persuade the trier of fact,
by a preponderance of evidence, that [the] settlement did not represent a
reasonable resolution f plaintiff's claim or that the settlement was the product
of fraud or collusion.
While the cited rule deals with the payment of a claim rather than a
contribution action, the payer would argue that it applies equally in the
context of a contribution action seeking reimbursement for defense
costs.
The non-payer would respond by asserting that the predicate of the
above rule has not been met. Rather, the "basic or foundational facts"
must be credible and must demonstrate a bona-fide claim. As the
California Supreme Court wrote in 1995, "[T]he burden is on the insured
to bring the claim within the basic scope of coverage .... 4"' Because
this "basic scope of coverage" manifestly does not include claims
brought through collusive fraud, the stipulated shifting of burden never
occurs. By analogy, the payer must carry the initial burden of
demonstrating credible facts supporting a duty to defend.
406. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 1997).
407. Id. at 918-19 (quoting Pruyn v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295,
313-14 (Ct. App. 1995)) (alterations in original).
408. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 625 (Cal. 1995).
2. Non-Payer Argument
a. Payer, As the Plaintiff in the Contribution Action, Must Carry the
Burden of Proof
In the 1997 case of Buss v. Superior Court, the California Supreme
Court addressed a question very similar to the present one, writing,
In a "mixed" action, when the insurer seeks reimbursement for defense costs
from the insured, which party must carry the burden of proof?
The answer is: It is the insurer that must carry the burden of proof.
The reason is this. Evidence Code section 500 provides that, generally, a
party desiring relief must carry the burden of proof thereon. We can find no
exception f~r0 an insurer seeking reimbursement for defense costs. We will
create none.
By analogy, the non-payer would argue that the payer who "seeks
reimbursement for defense costs" must carry the burden of proof.
The payer would reject this analogy, pointing out that the law of
contribution is wholly distinct from the law applicable to the
reimbursement of non-covered defense costs from the insured. The
former reflects purely equitable considerations, while the latter reflects
the largely contractual relationship of insurer to insured. Owing to this
difference in genesis and purpose, the analogy simply fails.
IV. PROPOSED RESOLUTION
This final section offers a proposed resolution to the difficult and very
important issues discussed in the preceding section.
A. An Insurer Does Not Have a Duty to Defend when It "Knows" that
the Insured Is Perpetrating Collusive Fraud
The arguments advanced on behalf of the payer on this issue are not
convincing. First, as discussed in Part JIl.A.l.a, the complaint rule has
been abandoned by California. Second, the fact that the duty to defend
applies notwithstanding a fraud on the insured is simply not dispositive
in the context assumed herein-that of collusive fraud. The reason is
simple: In the case of a fraud on the insured, the insured is innocent and
has presumably purchased insurance in part to protect against just such
an exposure. By contrast, the insured perpetrating collusive fraud on the
insurer is engaged in an intentional act, indeed a criminal act. The
409. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997).
410. Id. at 778. The court went on to identify the standard of such burden of proof
as the preponderance of the evidence. See id.
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obvious lack of mutual assent for such coverage, as well as the language
of section 533 of the California Insurance Code, preclude coverage in
the context of a fraud on the insurer. Third, the mere convenience of the
payer's proposed absolutist rule should not overcome the interests of
justice. By the same reasoning, the Supreme Court rejected an absolute
rule in favor of a more just rule in connection with obscenity,
explaining, "This may not be an easy road, free from difficulty. But no
amount of 'fatigue' should lead us to adopt a convenient 'institutional'
rationale-an absolutist [view]-[simply] because it will lighten our
burdens.'"" The interests of justice demand that the duty to defend be
evaluated on a case by case basis, and, where there is collusive fraud,
there simply is no duty to defend.
B. When There Is Substantial Evidence that the Insured Is Perpetrating
Collusive Fraud, an Insurer Can Refuse to Defend
Without Breaching Any Duty
Insurance companies perform several important functions for society.
First, insurers spread risk by affording coverage to its good-faith
insureds. Second, insurance companies provide all the benefits of a
commercial enterprise-high-value products for consumers,
employment for its workforce, and profits for its investors. To properly
fulfill these important functions, insurers must have the discretion to
deny non-meritorious claims.4 2
But, what if the insurer is mistaken? What if the "substantial
evidence" leads to an incorrect conclusion? What if the insured has not
participated in collusive fraud? Even though such mistakes will
inevitably occur, there is reason to believe that we are still better off
allowing the good-faith insurer to deny highly suspicious claims. A
commentator explains,
[In the real world] the insurer must decide how to act on the basis of the only
information that it is economical to obtain-the suspicion of fraud by a claims
adjuster. The insurer has two pure strategies available. It can ignore the
suspicion of fraud and pay all claims, or refuse to pay any claim when a
411. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973).
412. A California appellate court recognized this when it wrote, "Bad faith litigation
is not a game, where insureds are free to manufacture claims for recovery. Every
judgment against an insurer potentially increases the amounts that other citizens must
pay for their insurance premiums." Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 882, 891 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting J.G. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 844 (Ct. App. 1997)).
suspicion of fraud arises....
The pure strategy of ignoring the suspicion of fraud in every case is
unlikely to be optimal ... because fraud would then become... rampant ....
The pure strategy of denying all claims when fraud is suspected will eliminate
fraud ... but at the cost of denying [too many valid claims].... Thus, the best
feasible insurance arrangement... likely involves the denial of suspicious
claims [having a probability of fraud in excess of a certain threshold]....
[ 'S]uppose that insureds with valid claims that have been denied because
of a suspicion of fraud will typically fie suit. Insureds whose claims are
fraudulent, by contrast, will not file suit or will drop the suit in the early stages
if it does not result in a quick settlement. Then the willingness of the insured A9
press the claim to conclusion... [may serve as] an efficient screening device.
The same author goes on to explain why litigation may be the most
efficient method of resolving suspicious claims.
Insureds whose claims are fraudulent may have good reason to fear that
evidence will somehow develop to impeach their factual claims....
... In course of informal dealings with the insured, the threat of civil or
criminal sanctions for false statements may be quite remote and unlikely to
materialize, whereas the likelihood of serious sanction for demonstrably false
testimony given under oath may be much greater. An insured involved in
formal litigation may thus be more likely to tell the truth. Furthermore, the
insurer's ability to investigate the insured's claims effectively may be
considerably increased in litigation by the availability of discovery and the
prospect of sanctions for plaintiffs who do not comply with discovery requests
in good faith.
For these reasons, it is not implausible that insureds who file fraudulent
claims will not file suit after they are denied or will drop the case quickly if
faced with resistance from the insurer. It is also plausible that sorting cases in
this manner, despite the need for the parties to incur significant litigition costs,
is nevertheless cheaper and more accurate than the alternatives ....
Allowing the insurer the discretion to deny coverage based on
substantial evidence of collusive fraud makes sense for several reasons:
First, such a rule works to reduce the parasitic burden of fraud on the
economy. Second, given the strong disincentives to bad-faith conduct
currently afforded by punitive damages, there is little likelihood that
such a rule would promote abuse in any appreciable manner. Third, the
rule makes sense because the insurer often has no reasonable alternative,
due to the requirement in many cases that a declaratory relief action be
stayed until the plaintiffs claims have been tried. Finally, the rule
makes sense because it is fair. While innocent insureds can still pursue
judicial remedies (including punitive damages) when insurers deny
coverage, fraudulent insureds attempting to manipulate the system
encounter a formidable barrier in the appropriately skeptical non-payer.
413. Sykes, supra note 99, at 426-27, 428-29.
414. Id. at 428-29.
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C. The Notion of "Gatekeeper" Duties Has No Basis in Law and
Serves No Useful Purpose
As discussed above, the notion of the payer owing "gatekeeper" duties
to the non-payer simply has no basis in law. Moreover, any such duty
would be inconsistent with an analogous situation concerning Cumis
counsel and its relationship to the insurer paying the Cumis counsel's
bill. Here the courts have held that Cumis counsel owes no general duty
of care to the insurer."' Rather, Cumis counsel owes only those specific
duties enumerated by statute.4 6 Since an insurer cannot sue Cumis
counsel for negligent handling of a case, by analogy, the non-payer in
the contemplated contribution action has no cause of action against the
payer.
D. In Order for the Payer to Prevail in the Contemplated
Contribution Action, the Non-Payer Must Be Found
to Have Breached Its Duty to Defend
In any contribution action, the plaintiff must demonstrate four facts:
(1) multiple insurers insure the same insured;41 7 (2) these multiple
insurers insure the same risk (and therefore can be considered equivalent
insurers);40 (3) the plaintiff is one of these equivalent insurers and has
paid more than its legal obligation on a covered risk;419 and (4) the
defendant is one of these equivalent insurers and has paid less than its
legal obligation on the same covered risk.42 The non-payer will have
paid less than its legal obligation only if it has breached its duty to
defend. Accordingly, for the payer to prevail, it must show that the non-
payer had a duty to defend and failed to satisfy this duty. Public policy
arguments to the contrary are not persuasive, for the reasons cited
above.
421
415. See Assurance Co. v. Haven, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25,31-32 (Ct. App. 1995).
416. See id.
417. See CAL. PRAc. GUIDE INS. Lrr., supra note 228, ch. 9, § B, at 9:11.
418. See id. Note that this requirement precludes contribution in the context where
the payer was not legally obligated to defend but the non-payer was so obligated. While
the payer might have an action against the non-payer in such circumstances under a
theory other than contribution (such as the theory of equitable indemnity), such a
discussion lies beyond the scope of this Comment.
419. See supra Part III.D.2.a.
420. See supra Part Im.D.2.a.
421. See supra Part III.D.l.a.
E. The Burden in the Contemplated Contribution Action Should Be
Allocated as a Shifting Burden
1. Initially, the Non-Payer Must Demonstrate by a Preponderance of
the Evidence that Collusive Fraud Did in Fact Occur
In order to discourage frivolous claims, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure states, in part, "In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity." ' For the same reason, in the contemplated contribution
action, the non-payer should be made to demonstrate up-front and with
particularity the evidence of collusive fraud.42 Note, however, an
evidentiary aspect of the rule as proposed. The non-payer can attempt to
meet this preliminary burden-and the payer can rebut the non-payer's
attempt-by offering any evidence available at the time of the
contribution action. In other words, both parties are afforded the benefit
of hindsight for the limited purpose of this preliminary test.
Note that this evidentiary rule works as a double-edged sword.
Clearly the non-payer can bolster its case by gathering "late" evidence to
meet this hurdle. On the other hand, the insurer will be denied a
"collusive fraud" defense whenever the facts available at the trial belie
an earlier suspicion of collusive fraud. Moreover, the mere absence of
conclusive facts supporting the claim of collusive fraud at the time of the
trial will generally work against the non-payer.
2. Then, the Non-Payer Must Demonstrate to the Court that the
Non-Payer Had, at the Time of the Denial, Specific and
Credible Evidence of the Collusive Fraud
This rule resembles one found in the law of corporations whereby
stockholders, suing their corporation for waste and mismanagement,
"have the burden of coming forward with specific and credible
allegations sufficient to warrant [the] suspicion."' 24 According to this
rule, the stockholders (and, by analogy the non-payer) alleging the
wrongdoing need not prove the case at this juncture. 2 Rather the
stockholders (and, by analogy the non-payer) must demonstrate to the
court that the allegations are supported by some real and credible
422. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
423. Recall that, based on the definition of collusive fraud adopted herein, the sine
qua non of collusive fraud is the knowing involvement of the insured in the collusion.
For this reason, a scenario involving an innocent insured and his or her fraudulent
attorney represents a different circumstance, as discussed supra note 298.
424. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Del. 1996).
425. See id.
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evidence.426 Restricting the evidence to that known at the time of the
denial of coverage comports with the well-established rules defining the
duty to defend. Accordingly, the non-payer cannot use the benefit of
hindsight to justify its decision.
3. Assuming the Non-Payer Has Met the First Two Burdens, It Must
Then Demonstrate to the Court that It Produced a Written
Demand for Assurance from the Insured
This right of reasonable assurance is familiar in the law of contracts.
Accordingly, section 2-609(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides in part, "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing
demand adequate assurance of due performance... ,427 While this
provision generally serves to protect the vendor in a commercial sale of
goods, borrowing the concept for present purposes makes sense. First,
insurance policies are contracts. Second, when a good-faith insurer
suspects collusive fraud, it certainly has the requisite "reasonable
grounds for insecurity" regarding the insured's performance. Third,
requiring a demand for assurance in the present context affords the
insured the kind of notice universally required in insurance law.4n
Fourth, the demand for assurance and the ensuing response will
constitute useful evidence created at the legally critical point in time-
i.e., when the non-payer definitively refuses to defend.
The requirement of a written demand for assurance should emphasize
substance over form. Any writing which would notify the insured of the
insurer's particular "insecurity" should suffice. Thus, if the insurer
repeatedly makes inquiries which clearly manifest the insurer's
suspicion of collusive fraud, the "demand" requirement will have been
satisfied.
426. See id.
427. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1962).
428. See JERRY, supra note 51, § 111 (f), at 750-51. Indeed the insurer must already,
by California statute, provide a prompt notice when coverage is denied. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 554 (West 1993); Francis v. Iowa Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 297 P. 122, 124 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1931) (finding that an insurer that denied coverage "should have notified the
insured so that [the insured] could protect himself by conforming literally to the terms of
the contract regarding [the] proof of loss"). Accordingly, the requirement of a demand
for reassurance constitutes no significant change from the status quo today in California.
4. Then, the Non-Payer Must Demonstrate to the Court that
the Insured Failed to Act to Dispel the Non-Payer's
Concerns in an Objectively Satisfactory Manner
A corollary of the preceding rule is that the insured's response must be
evaluated by the court. If the insured's response provides adequate
assurance, the non-payer will not be excused of its duty to defend.4 29
5. Finally, Assuming the Non-Payer Has Met Its Burdens,
the Burden Shifts to the Payer to Demonstrate (by a
Preponderance of the Facts) to the Finder of Fact
that the Non-Payer Was Nonetheless Not Justified
in Denying Coverage-Based on the Standard of
a Reasonable and Good-Faith Insurer
If and only if the non-payer has met each of the preceding four
burdens, the burden shifts to the payer as plaintiff to prove its case. As
in the case of an insurer seeking reimbursement for defense costs
allocable to non-covered claims, the insurer must prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence.4 30  This final determination, being
predominantly a determination of fact, is made by the trier of fact-
typically a jury. The issue for the jury is not whether a fraud has been
committed. Indeed that has already been shown by the non-payer in
overcoming its first burden. Rather, the jury must determine whether the
non-payer's denial of coverage was justified, based solely on the
evidence the non-payer possessed at the time-including the "demand
for assurance" and any responses thereto. In arriving at a decision, the
jury should apply the very familiar, albeit nebulous, standards of
reasonableness and good faith. Essentially, the jury must decide whether
the non-payer conducted itself in a manner commensurate with
contemporary expectations of insurance companies. Or, more
succinctly: Did it "do the right thing" in denying coverage?'
429. Placing the burden on the non-payer to prove non-cooperation of the insured
accords with the prevailing rule in most jurisdictions. See JERRY, supra note 51,
§ 110(d), at 726.
430. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766,778 (Cal. 1997).
431. Three remaining issues lie beyond the scope of this Comment but warrant brief
mention. (1) Once the contribution of defense costs has been resolved, there might also
be an issue regarding contribution for any indemnity costs. If the non-payer has
prevailed on the issue of defense costs, it will certainly prevail on indemnity costs. This
is because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. See supra Part II.C.
If, on the other hand, the payer has prevailed on the issue of defense costs, the non-payer
may or may not also be liable for such contribution. (2) Assuming the payer prevails
regarding the non-payer's duty to defend, what rule then applies to determine the
reasonableness of the defense cost? Should the payer be required to do an extensive
accounting of defense costs, or will its actual defense expenditures be presumed
[VOL. 36: 797, 1999] Contribution Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION-APPLYING THE RULE
This Comment has addressed the issues and arguments concerning a
contribution action seeking reimbursement of defense costs in the wake
of collusive fraud (or the allegation thereof). Part IV proposed a rule of
law for deciding such cases. Applying the law to the actual post-
Alliance contribution action (which was dismissed on the grounds of the
applicable statute of limitations), the trial would proceed as follows:
First, the non-payer would presumably have no problem demonstrating,
by virtue of evidence available at the time of the trial (including
numerous criminal convictions), that the insured had perpetrated
collusive fraud. The non-payer would then proceed to reconstruct the
scene immediately prior to the denial of coverage, including specific
factual details to support its suspicion at the time of collusive fraud. If
the court finds such evidence to be not credible, judgment should be
awarded forthright to the payer. If, however, the court finds such
evidence to be credible, the non-payer would then need to prove that it
issued to the insured a written demand for assurance. Assuming it had
done so, the court would proceed to evaluate the response of the insured.
If the court finds the response to be objectively adequate to allay the
non-payer's fears, judgment should be awarded forthright to the payer.
If, however, the court considers the response to have been inadequate,
the burden would shift to the payer to prove his case to the finder of fact,
by a preponderance of the evidence. In this orderly manner, the rule of
law would serve justice on the parties to the contribution action. Such a
rule of law would also reinforce the proper incentives for insurers.
Insurers would be both encouraged to honor bona-fide claims and
motivated to assist in society's critical battle against fraud.
GUY WILLIAM McROSKEY
reasonable? (3) Finally, to what extent will the findings in the contemplated contribution
action constitute collateral estoppel in a subsequent bad-faith action by the insured
against the non-payer?
@$ O
